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## THESIS

### PROFESSIONALIZING THE ESTONIAN RESERVE COMPONENT

by

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December 1998

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**PROFESSIONALIZING THE ESTONIAN RESERVE COMPONENT**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

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


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
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## **ABSTRACT**

As new democracies such as the Republic of Estonia decide how to structure their military forces for the future, they will need to determine the mix of two different force components: standing-active duty forces, and reserve forces composed of citizen-soldiers. This thesis argues that reliance on reserves can offer significant advantages over standing forces, depending on a nation's external security requirements and domestic economic constraints. In particular, citizen-soldier reserves can allow nations that do not face immediate external threats, such as Estonia, to meet their security requirements for less money than required by standing forces. Citizen-soldier reserves are also less likely to pose a domestic threat to democratic civilian control. Both issues are of special concern to nations such as Estonia, where the process of democratic consolidation is still underway, and little funding is available for defense.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As new democracies such as the Republic of Estonia decide how to structure their military forces for the future, they will need to determine the mix of two different force components: standing active-duty forces, and reserve forces composed of citizen-soldiers. This thesis argues that reliance on reserves can offer significant advantages over reliance on standing forces, depending on a nation's external security requirements and domestic economic constraints. In particular, citizen-soldier reserves can allow nations that do not face immediate external threats, such as Estonia, to meet their security requirements for less money than required by standing forces. Citizen-soldier reserves are also less likely to pose a domestic threat to democratic civilian control. Both issues are of special concern to nations such as Estonia, where the process of democratic consolidation is still underway, and little funding is available for defense.

Force-structure options for nations such as Estonia comprise two basic choices: 1) active forces made up of professional soldiers, and 2) reserve forces made up of citizen-soldiers who maintain civilian professions, and in time of national or local need, step forward for military service. The National Defense League (NDL) or the *Kaitseliit* within the Republic of Estonia is a classic example of a citizen-soldier reserve force.

Using Estonia as a case study, I will examine how a nation can best evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of relying on a citizen-soldier military structure. The essential policy question addressed in this thesis is what factors should determine the role of citizen-soldier reserves in a nation's overall force structure.

I found that four criteria are most useful for determining the proper role of citizen-soldier reserves: the severity of the threat environment; economic constraints; the degree of democratic consolidation within a nation; and the relationship of society to the government. Estonia offers a classic example of a nation that could benefit from a heavy reliance on citizen-soldier reserves. For such reserves to be effective, however Estonia will have to make significant improvements in the organization, equipment, and training of the *Kaitseliit*.

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more about this thesis than her own cancer, I will always be deeply indebted. And to the plethora of other relatives and friends, who sustained my spirit while I worked on this project, I extend my sincere thanks. Their belief in my abilities sustains me in everything I do.

Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my wife, Julie, who owns my heart.

## I. INTRODUCTION

As new democracies such as the Republic of Estonia decide how to structure their military forces for the future, they will need to determine the mix of two different force components: standing active-duty forces, and reserve forces composed of citizen-soldiers. This thesis argues that reliance on reserves can offer significant advantages over reliance on standing forces, depending on a nation's external security requirements and domestic economic constraints. In particular, citizen-soldier reserves can allow nations such as Estonia (which do not face an immediate external threat) to meet their security requirements for less money than would be required by standing forces. Citizen-soldier reserves are also less likely to pose a domestic threat to democratic civilian control. Both issues are of special concern to nations such as Estonia, where the process of democratic consolidation is still underway, and little funding is available for defense.

Force structure options for nations such as Estonia involve two basic choices: 1) active forces made up of professional soldiers, and 2) reserve forces made up of citizen-soldiers who maintain civilian professions, and in time of national or local need, step forward for military service. The National Defense League (NDL) or the *Kaitseliit* within the Republic of Estonia is a classic example of a citizen-soldier reserve force.

Using Estonia as a case study, I will examine how a nation can best evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of relying on a citizen-soldier military structure. The essential policy question addressed in this thesis is what factors should determine the role of citizen-soldier reserves in a nation's overall force structure.

I found that four criteria are most useful for determining the proper role of citizen-soldier reserves: the severity of the threat environment; economic constraints; the degree of democratic consolidation within a nation; and the relationship of society to the government. Estonia offers a classic example of a nation that could benefit from a heavy reliance on citizen-soldier reserves. For such reserve to be effective, however, Estonia will have to make significant improvements in the organization, equipment, and training of the NDL.

Estonia provides an appropriate point of departure for two reasons. First, the future of Estonian security is important to peace in Europe. The Baltic countries lie in a strategically sensitive region. If Estonia is able both to devise an effective force structure and help preserve Baltic security, the stability of the region will be easier to preserve. Second, Estonia is an ideal case study for assessing the role of reserve forces. Estonia already has an established reserve force, the NDL. Estonian officials disagree over how much the nation should rely on this force rather than active-duty conscripts. By examining the criteria that nations should use to make such decisions, and applying those criteria to Estonia, this thesis will offer broader insights concerning the role of citizen-soldier reserves in the post-Cold War era.

## **A. STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE THESIS**

Although citizen-soldier forces have existed for thousands of years, confusion still persists about their defining characteristics. Chapter II will first review historical



examples of the implementation of the citizen-soldier option and how successful it has been in the past. This review will highlight the essential elements that differentiate the citizen-soldier concept from standing active-duty forces. This chapter will also examine the criteria that a state might use to determine the role of citizen-soldiers reserves in their overall force structure. In theory, a great variety of criteria could be employed. My analysis identifies which criteria are most significant, and describes how variations in these criteria should drive defense decision-making towards a reserve/active-duty mix.

Chapter III takes this analytical framework and applies it to the case of Estonia. In particular, I evaluate 1) the severity of the external threat to Estonia, 2) the economic constraints on Estonian Defense budgeting, 3) the degree of democratic consolidation within Estonia, and 4) the relationship of the Estonian people to the government.

In Chapter IV, I will make policy recommendations based on the analysis in Chapter III. I conclude that Estonia should rely heavily on citizen-soldiers reserves and maintain only very limited active-duty forces. I also conclude that Estonia possesses the necessary social and political prerequisites for a successful citizen-soldiery. Estonia has an educated and active populace, and a robust set of state institutions to provide the foundation for a successful reserve component. However, there is a great deal of work to be done before the current organization of the NDL can be transformed into a viable part of the Estonian defense establishment. I identify the shortfalls that exist and examine how they might be rectified.

## **B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

As a newly liberated nation, Estonia is currently working through its transition to democracy, while attempting to build a defense strategy that incorporates a reserve structure with historical roots. Revived from the former Estonian Republic, the NDL has made significant gains towards providing an effective citizen-soldier base for incorporation into the reserve military structure. In the future, a number of factors suggest that Estonia should increase its reliance on this reserve force. Estonia faces no immediate threat of invasion. If such a threat were to exist, a large standing military would be appropriate. Given the absence of such a threat, and the need for "insurance" against an uncertain future, a well-led and adequately equipped NDL should be able to meet the bulk of Estonia's external security requirements.

Estonia also faces significant economic constraints as it moves from a command to a market economy. Therefore, the resources to build and maintain a standing military are not available at this time.

In terms of the consolidation of democracy in Estonia, the nation has made terrific progress. A good constitutional structure for civilian control of the military is clearly in place. Standing militaries can often pose dangers to civilian control where democratic consolidation is incomplete. Estonia is a new democracy. Under these circumstances, a

reserve force is more consistent with the need to ensure that the Estonian military continues to pose no threat to democratic consolidation.

Finally, Estonia also possesses the social base of a democratic society that can support the requirements of the citizen-soldier concept, and take advantage of its potential benefits. Social conditions and the encouragement of citizens to become involved with their political surroundings are critical for transitioning democracies. Citizen-soldier defense organizations can provide additional benefits by not only encouraging members of society to take an active role in the defense of their nation, but by contributing additional resources to local governments in time of need. This can bolster overall involvement at both the community and national levels.

## **II. PROFESSIONAL RESERVE-COMPONENTS VS. ACTIVE-DUTY FORCE STRUCTURE**

### **A. EVOLUTION OF CITIZEN-SOLDIER VS. ACTIVE-DUTY PROFESSIONALS**

Now more than ever, an economic and realistic form of defense organization needs to be established for democratic nations, particularly those transitioning from totalitarian regimes. In the case of Estonia, which cannot afford a huge defense budget but has real security concerns, an effective and affordable defense structure must be established. It is therefore my contention that the citizen-soldier concept can not only meet the needs of providing a economical defense structure, but can also provide support to republican values. As many nations including the United States wrestle with huge defense budgets in the post- Cold War era, few can sacrifice security for economics. A simple review of history can provide the incentive to use an old concept that, when adapted to the modern world, can achieve the desired effect: the citizen-soldier.

The citizen-soldier concept is one that goes back as far as the Greek city-state. By utilizing a historical perspective of the citizen-soldier concept, it is easy to see its advantages and limitations. This analysis will identify the fundamental elements of the concept and will then apply them to Estonia.

The basic idea of the citizen-soldier is one that embraces the concept of the Republic and the means of its protection. A Republic is a form of government that derives its power from the governed. Through representative government, the will of the people is expressed through the electorate. Therefore, the citizen-soldier has been seen

"...as the proper recourse for republican citizens seeking to defend their political liberties, their property, and ultimately their freedom."<sup>1</sup>

Not only did the responsibility of self-government fall to the people, but so also its defense. This duality promoted the premise that rights and responsibilities are inseparable. An illustration of this is the farmer who tills the land he owns, benefits by its harvest, oversees its interests through representative government (a republic), and is also obliged to protect it in times of danger. During pre-industrial times, the concept of the Republic was tied closely to agrarian societies so that ownership of land and property played a major role in determining who was involved in the democratic process. Thus, not everyone was entitled to vote and participate in the process of government, as the right of citizenship was most commonly reserved for males who owned property. Since then, the idea of citizenship has expanded to most individuals in society based on a broadened interpretation of citizenship.

This early idea of the democratic process also embraced the theory that the individual's role in society was first as a citizen and then as a soldier. Early societies placed higher value on economic sustenance than on the profession of arms. Military service was viewed as a civic duty, and not a profession unto itself. Therefore, military service was by its nature a secondary priority for every citizen of the republic.

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<sup>1</sup> Jerry Cooper, *The Militia and the National Guard in America Since Colonial Times: A Research Guide* Greenwood Press, 1993, 16. Quoted in Gary Hart *The Minuteman*, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 77.

Additionally, this democratic form of government conceived the notion that a strong, centralized (federal) government was counterproductive to the basic tenets of the Republic.

New-born states [were] the focal point of mobilization, [they displayed] a distrust of central authority and strong conscription, and a military informality resistant to strict discipline, [the] stark separation of officers, and men, and professionalism generally.<sup>2</sup>

Therefore, to avoid standing armies, the citizens of the republic were obliged to support the defense structure needed to maintain security from external threats. The first real example of this concept was clearly seen in ancient Greece:

The ethic of the Greek citizen-soldier was based upon his willingness to make any sacrifice necessary to defend his land, family, community, and the common good.<sup>3</sup>

In Athenian society, citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-two were considered candidates for military service:

Those citizens between the ages of eighteen and twenty took an oath and served as ephebes [plebes or recruits]. They were given military and civic training in their first year of service; during this first year they served as well on guard duty at the port of Athens. In their second year, they received the shield and spear of a hoplite (so called after the hoplon, the great shield born by these phalanx warriors) at state expense. They then served on garrison duty on the Athenian frontiers. After this point, they joined the regular body of citizens.<sup>4</sup>

This linkage of military service with the concept of citizenship clearly illustrates the idea of the Republic and its citizens' responsibility for defending it. This provided the

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<sup>2</sup> E. Wayne Carp, "Early American Military History: a Review of Recent Work," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 94 (July 1986) 276. Quoted in Gary Hart, *The Minuteman*, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 77.

<sup>3</sup> Gary Hart, *The Minuteman*, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 83.

<sup>4</sup> Michael M. Sage, *Warfare in Ancient Greece* (Routledge, 1996) 35. Quoted in Gary Hart, *The Minuteman*, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 80.

Athenians with a viable defense mechanism, which lasted up until the Peloponnesian War. During this war, the introduction of mercenaries into the Athenian system created a decline in, and the eventual elimination of the citizen-soldier concept. As this protracted war dragged on, the wealth of the Republic was utilized to enlist soldiers that were considered less honorable than the *hoplites*. As the professionally-minded soldiers slowly assumed the direction of the war, the idea of a protracted conflict, or total war, emerged. Therefore, the end of the Athenian citizen-soldiery ushered in the concept of a professional military, which changed the direction and scope of warfare and the idea that soldiering was secondary to citizenship. The same circumstance occurred in the Roman Republic when it transitioned from a citizen-based military to the professional Roman Legions:

Rome's military was small, family-based, relatively unstratified. Early republican political and especially military leaders of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. were characterized more by their resistance to public office than by their lust for it.<sup>5</sup>

Great leaders like Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus were reluctant to serve in public office. When elected consul of Rome, he preferred to remain on his farm. This philosophy towards public service was one of serving only in time of national emergency. Cincinnatus illustrated the willingness to serve for the common good, yet at the same time demonstrated a stronger commitment to the individual than to the state. This concept of individualism is rooted in the understanding that the responsibility to guard personal rights is found in the collective good. Cincinnatus' understanding of these

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<sup>5</sup> Gary Hart, *The Minuteman*, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 84.

principles led fellow citizens to elect him because of his values, not because he desired the position. The citizen-soldier concept along with the republic were eventually lost to the imperialistic Empire and the centralized power of Caesar. Much like Athens before it, Rome moved towards an army of conquest for the sake of imperialistic motives.

A great scholar of republics, Niccolo Machiavelli underscored the need for the citizen-soldier in his work, *Art of War (Arte della Guerra)*. Machiavelli viewed the intertwining of the citizen and his responsibility to the defense of the republic as the essence of civic virtue. He advocated the following:

[a] well-ordered republic combining the fierceness of the lion to frighten away the wolves with the shrewdness of the fox in avoiding the snares, and citizens who place the common good at least equal to if not before self-interest.<sup>6</sup>

Machiavelli's grasp of the concept went even further as he compared the citizen-soldier to the mercenaries:

A citizen called to arms, with a home and an occupation of his own, will wish to end the war and go home, where a mercenary, glad rather than sorry if the war drags on indefinitely, will make no attempt to win it.<sup>7</sup>

This statement makes evident Machiavelli's loathing of mercenaries, and specifies the core value of the citizen-soldier concept. When this core value is translated even further, it indicates that a militia is defensive rather than aggressive.

Machiavelli's understanding of this was clearly seen in his dissertation to the princes of his time. In the "*The Prince*" he provides a haunting warning: "the arms of another man [mercenary] either slide off your back, weigh you down, or tie you up."<sup>8</sup> He

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 89.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 90.



clearly saw that the respective declines of the Greek and Roman empires were connected to a lack of duty and responsibility on the part of civilians to the republic. Machiavelli clearly understood the value of the citizen-soldier, not only for defense, but also for society. This understanding created new thinking in the field of military force structure.

The next time in history we see the rise of the citizen-soldier to any significant degree is during the formation of the English militia in the Eighteenth Century. This was the New Model Army, which was formed for a variety of reasons, both practical and political. The fact that the citizenry held a large number of arms, and the townships possessed large quantities of munitions (enough to sustain a siege) required a new concept of military structure, different from that of the old feudal system:

In 1655, Cromwell revived the militia to combat the widespread conspiracy of that year, and it was militia of a sort, not ordinary troops, that were placed at the disposal of that epitome of military rule, the Major Generals.<sup>9</sup>

As a result, the militia system was not truly a form of defense of the republic, but rather was formed during this time to protect the government from the people. This was an interesting use of the militia, but not in accordance with the citizen-soldier concept. Cromwell understood the great power that is contained within a citizen-soldier force. A key point of Cromwell's concept deals with the effectiveness of the militia as a military organization. The citizen militia was an effective force to provide for the internal security of the nation, but not effective when used to project force outside of the nation.

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<sup>9</sup> J.R. Western, *The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century* (Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press, 1965) 7.

The militia was used to provide internal security, to maintain the public order, and to "secure the permanence of the Restoration by the frustration of plots and the repression of disloyalty."<sup>10</sup> This intriguing political application becomes more prevalent later when different governmental institutions debated who controlled the militia. From 1660 to the 1670s, the King and the Parliament debated over who controlled the militia. These debates frequently ended in a deadlock. This English example clearly identifies the power of the common man in relation to the power of military force.

The militia was needed both to provide for the security of the government and to insure domestic survivability of the Restoration. The political strife between the executive and legislative branches of government was more pronounced later, particularly within the United States system.

The most contemporary experience of the militia concept is seen within the American colonial system. The British example was used by this fledgling young colony not only to provide for its protection from other European powers, but also to provide a force to contend with the North American wilderness. The idea that members of the community were required to serve in order to protect their property and families was a realistic manner of defense for the young colonies:

The militia heritage, together with the sense of military insecurity and the inability of the economically poor colonies to maintain an expensive professional army, all combined to guarantee that the Elizabethan militia would be transplanted to the North American Colonies.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>11</sup> Gary Hart, *The Minuteman*, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 95-96.

Ironically, this system was successful in expelling the English during the American Revolution. With thirteen autonomous colonies, there were thirteen different militias who operated independently from each other. However, the common bond was that the colonial militia system was a requirement for all male members of the colony. There were age considerations, but they had little impact on the availability of all men within the colonies. Militiamen were expected to own and maintain their weapons and munitions so that, when called upon, the individual was ready and able to participate in military operations. This was not unusual, since the maintenance of arms and supplies was part of the day-to-day life of a colonist in the wilderness.

Periodic musters (formations, or gatherings of troops) were conducted to determine available strength, status of equipment, and readiness of these militiamen. Not standardized throughout the colonies, these thirteen individual armies were led mainly by political forces within the colonies themselves. Therefore, standardization within the militias was as diverse as the political landscape within the colonies.

The most notable factor in the emergence of the American militia system and the American military infrastructure was that two distinct armies developed during the Revolutionary War. As this new nation was coming to grips with a revolution against the British realm, it also had to develop its own military. What occurred is quite remarkable and should be considered a model for today's developing nations.

George Washington formed the Continental Army, which was augmented with colonial militias during the conflict. This concept of two armies capitalized on the need for a small centralized force to combat the aggressor (British), and supplemented it with a

larger decentralized citizen-soldier force to provide the combat power to win the day. By combining these two types of armies, George Washington proved that the strength of a military defense structure was found in the advantages and disadvantages of both systems. The organization and discipline of the Continental Army and integration of the sheer numbers and combat-power resource of the colonial militias set the stage for a comprehensive defense structure.

Although the Continental Army and the colonial militia structures would find themselves at odds with each other, this inherent conflict provided the checks and balances needed to protect the republic from internal destruction by military coups. At the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, the founding fathers were confronted with the question: "...shall we have a standing army or citizen militia and, if a standing army, what is its mission?"<sup>12</sup>

This issue was the center of great controversy, as it will always be within a republic. One notable legal scholar, William Blackstone, stated:

In free states...no man should take up arms but with a view to defend his country and its laws; he puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp; but it is because he is a citizen, and would wish to continue so, that he makes for a while a soldier.<sup>13</sup>

The debate on the standing army and the militia continues today. Throughout the history of the United States the two armies remained: one to guard the republic, the other to guard the nation. They worked hand-in-hand and at odds with each other. The key to the United States' stability and success has been the balancing of advantages and

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 97.

<sup>13</sup> William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1783) Quoted In Gary Hart, *The Minuteman*, (New York: The Free Press, 1998) 98.

disadvantages between the two armies. This has been uniquely the American model, which may or may not be appropriate for other cultures or societies.

A contemporary model of the citizen-soldier concept is Sweden's military reserve system. This system is more closely related to the "man in arms" philosophy of most European nations and is a model to be considered by newly independent states.

This historical review has identified several important points to consider when looking at militias and the citizen-soldier concept. These considerations can be utilized to comprehend the basic ideals of the republican form of government with relationship to its defense establishment.

## **B. EXTERNAL SECURITY ROLE ISSUES**

All nations at one time or another face the question of security, because military power is quite often the key to national survival. State sovereignty has always rested securely on the shoulders of a military whose mission is to defend the nation from external aggression: "Military missions are determined in large part by the threat environment that a nation faces."<sup>14</sup> Therefore, the questions of how large the military force should be and how it should be designed are usually based on the threat to national interests. Consequently, economic factors, political input, and force structure must be considered. A nation must consider the sustainability of a large standing army (active force) or place its emphasis on a reserve-component. Additionally, a nation might even

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<sup>14</sup> Larry Diamond and Marc F Plattner. *"Civil-Military Relations and Democracy"* (Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1996) xiii.

consider a combination of both systems to capitalize on the benefits of each. These considerations are the fundamental issues with which a nation must deal when determining how its military forces will be designed.

There are many positive and negative factors when considering the active force. The advantage of a standing army is that it can provide a nation with a professional force that is ready at a moment's notice. This capability provides the nation with a military force that can quickly react to threats and is demonstrate its willingness to maintain sovereignty. An additional advantage is that contained within a standing army is an officer corps, which is the professional body that directs the military. In fact, with respect to the composition of an active-officer corps, Samuel Huntington considers three variables that set the tone for the entire organization: "The distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness."<sup>15</sup> The tone of the military organization is set by these characteristics as practiced by the officer corps.

The expertise of active units is clearly evident since they must maintain their readiness to defend the nation. This readiness equates to practicing combat skills and tactical deployment on a regular schedule. When mastered and practiced, this expertise is critical in times of conflict, and produces forces that are capable of effective military operations. Time plays a key role in maintaining the expertise of an individual. The more one practices a particular skill, the more proficient one becomes, no matter how

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<sup>15</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *"The Soldier and the State"*, (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard 1957) 8.

complicated the task. In large-scale military operations, the synchronization of the battlefield operating systems requires constant repetition to master these critical war-fighting tasks. Active forces possess the luxury of having the time to practice and hone their skills and operational arts. Active forces also maintain a high level of proficiency in their respective tasks because they practice their skills on a daily basis. This level of readiness cannot be matched by other components and is a clear advantage to having a standing force

Samuel Huntington also speaks of responsibility. Officers are directors of violence (combat operations) and are held accountable for their actions. This means that military commanders must answer to their respective civilian leaders. Therefore, authority rests with the civilian leadership while the military masters the means of power or physical force. This again sets the tone for the organization and sets the standard to which most standing armies adhere. By effective legal systems within militaries, leaders are held to a high level of accountability.

The element of corporateness, holds that the officer corps is a closed society of professionals who, through their shared experiences and their demanding lifestyles band together to form a select group. This cohesiveness creates a profession capable of producing effective leaders. This corporate mentality provides a military with a strong and determined leadership capable of maintaining high standards of dedication to national security.

Another consideration a standing army affords a national leader is the flexibility to use military force without being hampered by political requirements or mobilization

timetables. This allows quick and decisive action when needed to defend the nation. An active force is capable of the rapid response and force projection that national leaders need to react to international turmoil.

When reviewing the disadvantages of a large standing army, we can easily conclude that an active force can be a liability for any country because of the expense involved to maintain it. Large sums of money are spent on soldiers' salaries, billeting, equipment, and provisions to sustain an active military. The maintenance of a large active force can place a huge strain on a nation's budget and will cause political leaders to question its worth when compared to domestic requirements. The high expense to maintain an active force also brings with it political vulnerability.

The corporate aspect identified by Samuel Huntington can also be considered a negative factor in relation to the active force. A closed society can alienate itself from the society it protects, which in turn can cause distrust between the two. The separation between the military and the society it protects can cause critical problems in the host nation.

With respect to a consolidated democracy like the United States, this level of separation is constantly in transition, and is sometimes considered in crisis. Snider and Carlton-Carew note that the "relationship between general [military] and politician is often tense."<sup>16</sup> A democracy must insure that this friction is contained at a level that does not threaten the government itself.

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<sup>16</sup> Snider, Don M. and Carlton-Carew, Maranda A. *U.S. Civil-Military Relations*, (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995) vii.



The accessibility of a force can cause unscrupulous leaders to use the military in ways that are counterproductive to the society. An active force's quick reaction can easily usurp the more tedious process of political analysis. Therefore, the time needed to gain political acceptance for the use of military force could easily be expropriated. Moreover, the active military could be used improperly against the will of the nation. This is considered the most dangerous aspect of an active force. Civilian supervision is critical for the balance of power between the military and its civilian leadership.

Another negative aspect of an active military institution is its resistance to change. The restrictive thinking of the leadership within the military make rapid institutional change difficult. Resistance to change sometimes is produced when the civilian leadership does not understand the military. At their worst, military institutions have overthrown civilian authority (coups). Restrictive military thinking can be counterproductive when political leaders make changes in policy and national direction that adversely impact the active force. This mindset on the part of military leaders can cause abrasive relationships between the civil authority and the military institutions.

The same applies to the reserve-components. There are inherent advantages and disadvantages to this form of military structure. The most important advantage of a reserve-component is its cost-effectiveness. When a soldier is on duty for only a limited amount of time, costs are minimal. The advantage extends further into the service life of equipment and the minimum supplies needed to sustain a reserve-component as compared to a standing military. Usually the rule of thumb is that a nation can sustain four reserve-component soldiers for every one active-component soldier of equivalent

rank. This ratio gives a nation a four-to-one advantage in manpower for a reserve-component versus an active component. This ratio also impacts the military infrastructure; a nation does not have to sustain a huge number of military installations. Reserve-components require a less extensive infrastructure, in some cases sharing buildings to save costs.

The community factor of a reserve-component is that it provides a linkage to the society which the military ultimately serves. This linkage works both ways. The community supports their military more readily since its members are active participants. The corollary is that members of the military reserve see themselves as protectors of society and are less likely to act in ways counter to society's wishes. This relationship ties the military closely to the community. As a result, both organizations participate in the development of a population that involves itself in groups and social organizations (also known as social capital).

Reserve forces are usually larger than active military forces since the cost factors are lower and citizens do not have to make an entire career change. Therefore almost anyone in society can become a member of the military and maintain his/her civilian profession or occupation. This provides the members of the reserve with the opportunity to maintain their livelihoods while maintaining their military affiliations. This has a residual effect on society in that members of the military are provided with training that they can use in their respective civilian endeavors. Leadership training provided by the military can be effectively used in the civilian arena. These benefits are not readily apparent, but can provide additional military support to the community.

A reserve force used in conjunction with an active force can extend the society's investment in the entire military structure. When a soldier leaves the active force and enters the civilian world, the military can continue to use the investment in the soldier's training and education if he enters the reserve forces. This extends the initial investment made in training and education and expands the range of the military's influence. The military can retain a trained soldier longer and maintain a broader military-trained base to draw on during mobilization. A soldier who is in the reserve can sustain a higher level of proficiency than an ordinary citizen and affords the military the opportunity to keep personnel with a higher level of readiness.

A reserve-component also has disadvantages that should be considered when looking at force structure. The most significant factor is that a reserve-component maintains a lower level of proficiency than the active-duty, which is caused by the relative lack of training time available to develop war-fighting skills. Most of these skills are perishable (e.g. land navigation, weapons firing, crew training, etc.) and are lost when not practiced on a routine basis. Although some of these skills can be used in the civilian arena (e.g., law enforcement, engineering, and leadership), there is little opportunity to maintain proficiency outside formal military training periods for the most part. Therefore, a part-time force can only maintain a limited level of readiness that must be supplemented with a period of training before commitment to combat operations. This presents a problem to a nation since the force will require time to mobilize and deploy effectively. This time could be critical in the event of an immediate threat to sovereignty such as an invasion:

One of the most significant aspects is that considerable premobilization planning and preparation must take place if any of the alternatives described [levels of proficiency] are to occur smoothly early in the postmobilization period.<sup>17</sup>

Reserve-components have a tendency to produce what is known as the "good old boy" system and evolve into social clubs. This tendency occurs when members of the community remain in a particular unit for extended periods of time. If the leadership does not recognize this situation and react accordingly, military professionalism is lost to the group dynamics. Therefore, when considering a reserve-component and allocating resources to it, professionalism must be monitored and maintained.

This analysis of the differences between active and reserve forces reveals the fundamental differences between the two types of force structures. When weighing the advantages and disadvantages, a nation must take into account the threat and subsidiary factors of budget constraints, political realities, and social climate. When all factors are taken into account, a nation can effectively build a force structure that meets its security needs while balancing all of the pressures placed upon it.

## **C. POLITICAL ISSUES**

### **1. Republican Society**

Our world is made up of many societies and these societies are marked by unique cultures, values, and norms. Governments by their very nature conform themselves to the

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<sup>17</sup> RAND Corp. "Postmobilization Training Resource Requirements" (RAND Corp. Publishing Arroyo Center 1996) xviii.

values and norms of the society they govern. This manifestation of social values within governments is both deliberate and unintentional. The best place to identify these social values is in the nation's constitution. This document conveys the rule of law for the society and "a legal culture with strong roots in civil society and respected by political society and the state apparatus."<sup>18</sup> A constitution provides "a hierarchy of norms that make actions by, and upon, other arenas legitimate and predictable."<sup>19</sup> The end result is a constitution that expresses the values of the society it represents. This understanding of a democratic system of government provides the base for which the citizen-soldier concept can exist. Therefore, an understanding of the dynamics of the social base is critical for this study.

As we have seen in recent history, societies making the transition from totalitarian regimes to democratic societies tend to adapt themselves to the culture they represent. Historically a society rooted in individual rights and the protection of property migrates to a democratic form of government.

As we look at the dynamics of a democratic form of government, it is important to keep in mind that as a society moves from a totalitarian form of government to a democracy, the social base must also make the transition. During the Soviet occupation of Estonia, individual rights were not afforded to the members of society. As a result, after independence, individual rights were an alien concept to the general populace and have taken time to become integrated with societal norms. Understanding the dynamics

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<sup>18</sup> Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, Alfred. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. (Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1996) 14.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

of a stable democracy also helps determine if the social environment will support a citizen-soldier concept for a nation's defense strategy. The same social conditions that provide the base for the democratic environment to operate effectively also provide the conditions for the citizen-soldier system to operate properly.

Therefore, it is important to understand these two fundamental dimensions: 1) the republican principle, and 2) the variables needed for the existence of a stable democratic system. These aspects reinforce each other and provide the social dynamics for this type of government system.

In Webster's, the word *republic* is defined:

a state or nation in which the supreme power rests in all the citizens entitled to vote (the electorate) and is exercised by representatives elected, directly or indirectly, by them and responsible to them.<sup>20</sup>

The republican form of government is a form of representation of the people by elected officials. Thus, it is imperative that citizens of a republic be involved in politics for the process of government to work effectively and efficiently. As a result, forms of social capital are critical for the existence of a republican form of government. Citizen involvement in clubs, social organizations, political groups, and non-governmental organizations reflects a society that supports social interaction. This support in turn encourages citizens to take an active role in issues that influence them.

This creates a society that sustains the republican form of government. The net result is informed and committed citizens who take an active role in the government which represents them. This is supported by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan's argument:

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<sup>20</sup> Webster's New World Dictionary, 3rd College ed..

[whereas]...interests and values of civil society are the major generators of political society, civil society generates ideas and helps monitor the state apparatus and economic society.<sup>21</sup>

Historically, cultures that are educated transition to republican or democratic forms of government. The populace understands the dynamics of political impact, and by remaining involved, expresses its views through votes. This means a high value is placed on an educated populace that intellectually constructs the laws and institutional framework of government based on its morals and social values. This element is critical to the framework of the republican form of government, and is found at the grass-root level of society. This means that not only an educated elite, but also the general population should maintain a high level of literacy. I contend that the existence of widespread public and private secondary schools and universities shows a society that values learning and encourages creative thinking. A highly educated society is conducive to advanced forms of government and can clearly articulate the need for defense. Consequently, understanding the concepts of security, national unity, and protection of property establishes the base of an involved population.

Within a democratic society, economic soundness plays a critical role in the survival of the republic. Economic stability in transitioning nations is at best difficult when moving from a command economy to a market economy. The realization of private property and the sufficiency of material needs, are signs of continual economic growth. To many in the academic environment this element is critical to democratic

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<sup>21</sup> Juan J Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. (Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1996) 14.

government. This is best exemplified by the economic society that "produces the indispensable surplus to allow the state to carry out its collective good functions and provides a material base for the pluralism and autonomy of civil and political societies."<sup>22</sup>

Economic stability and liveliness of a democratic system are critical for the survival of the nation and, when viewed from the institutional level, can be expressed through the gross national product. The level of disposable income at the grass-roots level of society is where this economic well being is best illustrated.

It is therefore imperative to understand how a society relates to its military. In many respects, the citizens of a republican society are suspicious of standing armies. Consequently, it is beneficial for a military to be closer to the grass roots of society, rather than alienated and detached. This inherent feeling of suspicion towards the military is reflected in the political institutions. Table 1 provides the key elements of social base.

<b>SOCIAL BASE TO SUPPORT THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER CONCEPT</b>
A stable Republican or Democratic System of Government (Legitimacy)
Distribution of Social Capital
Educated populous
Participation
Sense of Benefit (worth - ownership)
Economic - Stability

Table 1. Social Base Key Elements

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid 14.



## **2. State Institutions**

Institutional support refers to the legislative and structural framework provided by the government in relation to the military. In this case, governmental institutions must be capable of providing direct support to the citizen-soldier. To identify these variables readily, it is critical to begin with the legislative components that legitimize the military and its respective reserve-component. In some cases, this may be spelled out in the constitution or specified through legislation directed towards the military as a whole. The critical variable is the existence of legislation that authorizes a military, establishes a chain of command during peacetime and conflict, and clearly specifies the role of the military within the framework of government.

Within a democratic system, it is critical that the military be subordinate to a civilian government. Therefore, legislation should contain the guidelines that clearly set the legal stage for the civilian authority to direct the military. In most democratic nations this is found somewhere within the constitution, which provides the basic legitimacy for the presence of a military structure. The constitution can be detailed or just provide the general guidance needed to create precise laws and legislation to deal with the specific issues. Most often the constitution outlines the branch of government to which the military will be subordinate. The issues of funding and appropriations usually are contained within the concept of the military. The end result is a government document that authorizes the existence of the military and prescribes its organization, civilian leadership, and support mechanisms. If these elements are specified, the critical variable of military legitimacy is present.

For a reserve-component this legitimacy may or may not be contained in the fabric of the constitution. If a reserve-component is to exist within the framework of the military structure, it is necessary for it to be legally created. In several cases, the source of the legal framework for legitimate military institutions has been the source of heated debate. Since republics, by their nature, fear standing armies, many nations include the fabric of a citizen-soldier organization within their legislation to prevent military coups.

These fundamental views shape civil-military relationships within democratic governments. As a result, we frequently see two-army systems. Such systems provide checks and balances on power. Many democracies have adopted this system as a stabilizing factor.

This creates a critical relationship between the civilian authority and the military. The most interesting aspect is that this relationship is an overlapping one. This creates a "systemic relation between the military and the civilian authority."<sup>23</sup> The best way to illustrate this relationship is contained in Figure 1, created by Sam C. Sarkesian and quoted by Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew in their book *"U.S. Civil-Military Relations."* This overlapping relationship within a democratic society can be achieved when the military is contained within the system of government, which in this case is ultimately the people themselves. This involvement by both the people and their institution of defense creates a balanced relationship. The overlapping aspects provide the civilian elites with authority over the military leadership and military society. This is based on the democratic principle that a military contained within a democratic socio-

political system is subordinate to it. For the sake of survival, they must be intertwined. This mutually supportive relationship needs to be clearly understood by both the military and the civilian elites.




Figure 1. Political Military Social System

The concept of gradient involvement of civilian authority over military policy (which I shall call leverage) ushers in an understanding of civil-military relations and the need to establish supremacy of civilian authority over military institutions. There are many variables that should be evaluated to determine the level of involvement of the

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<sup>23</sup> Don M. Snider and Maranda A. Carlton-Carew, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations*, (Washington D.C.; The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995) 5.

civilians in military issues and assure their ultimate control. "At their strongest, these institutions allow civilian rulers to effectively supervise and direct military forces."<sup>24</sup>

A critical element for civilian control of the armed forces is civilian personnel who understand the inner workings of the military and who hold supervisory positions within the ministry of defense. The government, which controls the military through policy and appropriations, must have trained personnel who understand military issues. It controls the budget, sets military policy, creates a military legal system, and procures and directs the military to adhere to standards set by the civilian authority. Having trained civilian personnel insures leverage over the military and its administration, and is critical to the civil-military relationship. If controlled by military personnel in civilian clothes, it becomes a mere tool of the military. If civilian experts are present and the focus of the ministry is on the political priorities set by the ruling party, then a strong gradient of civilian control exists. This involvement will insure that the military stays within the boundaries of its mission and does not extend into governmental tasks (as has occurred in many democratic nations).

This impact of civilian involvement in the management of the military extends to the reserve-component through control over reserve forces and policy. This civilian defense apparatus sets military policy, and if a nation's policy is to have a reserve structure within the organization, civilian authority extends to this arena as well. The end

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<sup>24</sup> Harold A. Trinkunas, *"Crafting Civilian Control of the Armed Forces: Statecraft, Institutions, and Military Subordination in Emerging Democracies"*. Dissertation Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Forthcoming.

result is a comprehensive organization that is capable of managing the defense policy, structure, and appropriations of a given nation.

The corollary to these variables is that the governmental framework provides the needed support for the military to perform its primary mission. As a result, the governmental institutions should be not only controlling the military but also providing for its existence and supplying the tools needed to perform its mission. In particular, governmental institutions should provide for the protection of the citizen-soldier who might perform military activities that conflict with civilian employment. When the soldier is paid by the government while performing military duties, laws should insure that the citizen-soldier is protected while serving for the national defense. In addition, the government should show its support through defense appropriations to provide the reserve-component with training finance and equipment.

The best way to express this gradient relationship between the military and its civilian authority is illustrated in Figure 2, created by Howard A. Trinkunus. In this diagram, concentric circles display the relationship between the levels of involvement of the military within the organizations of government and indicate a clear division of labor. The more the military crosses the lines from the center, the further away it gets from its required duties, and therefore the greater potential there is for civil-military conflict.




Figure 2. Gradient Levels of Military Involvement in Government

A final suggestion would be that the military should be contained within the sphere of its assigned duties to insure that it does not enter into the realm of government where it does not belong. The corollary is that civilian authority should give the military autonomy within its sphere of responsibility, which is the task of operations to maintain external security. There are times when lines can and must be crossed, but this should be done with caution.

Table 2 provides the fundamental areas that need to be examined to determine the level of civilian involvement with military decision-making. This can be used as a tool to determine the gradient level of civil-military involvement within a particular case study.

<b>Legality of Military Institutions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Constitutional legitimacy</li> <li>- Clearly defined civilian authority within legislation</li> </ul>
<b>Gradient of Involvement of Civilian Authority over Military Policy (Leverage)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Civilian-led defense ministries</li> <li>- Construction of military policy</li> <li>- Civilian control of budget</li> <li>- Evidence of civilian leverage over military</li> <li>- Civilian supervision</li> <li>- Civilian defense experts</li> <li>- Jurisdictional boundaries between civilian and military tasks</li> <li>- Military accountability to civilian authority</li> <li>- Military Personnel Issues: force structure, education and career tracks(promotions/entitlements)</li> </ul>

Table 2. Key Elements of Civil-Military Involvement

#### **D. EFFECTIVE RESERVE-COMPONENT FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS**

For a reserve-component to be considered viable to a defense strategy, a review of Samuel Huntington's aspects of professionalism is critical. Although these factors deal solely with standing professional armies, when supplemented with elements relevant to the uniqueness of a reserve-component, they can be used as a basis for reserve-component analysis. The following elements should always be considered: 1) organizing the force, 2) equipping the force, 3) training the force, and 4) the leadership dimension contained within the organization. With respect to the reserve-component, the following should also be considered: 5) the social base to support a citizen-soldier, and 6) institutional support for the citizen-soldier. These factors establish the dynamics of the

professional environment of a military organization within a reserve-component. The overall construction of a reserve military organization determines its ability to function effectively. This is the difference between a disorganized, armed rabble and a comprehensive military organization capable of disciplined tactical maneuver.

## **1. Organization**

The structure of a reserve-component should mirror comparable organizations within the national military infrastructure. The first element is the structure of command and control. Within the republic, this structure flows from the civilian authority directly to the military chain of command and is reflected through civilian policy, regulations, and legal statutes. Therefore, with respect to the formation of force structures, the organization of an infantry squad, therefore, should be the same in the reserve as it is in the active component. Regardless of the size and make-up of the structure, it is necessary to provide for continuity, which allows for interoperability. The structure should be operational in nature and capable of a war-fighting mission (e.g. a squad capable of performing squad level drills or tasks, or platoons capable of performing platoon-level tasks). The organizational structure must be clear and attainable. An authorized ten-man squad is not functional with three men. Hence, the following parameters should be present for the structure to be considered organizationally sound:

- Command and control, beginning with the civilian authority (republic or democratic system) which flows to the military, then down to the lower organizations within the force structure;
- A structure that is consistent with the other military organizations of that country's military force structure;
- A structure that is capable of accomplishing an assigned war-fighting mission;



- A clearly defined organizational structure that provides everyone with a position, and related duties and responsibilities;
- A structure that is attainable and realistic.

In conclusion, the force structure of a reserve-component must clearly be recognizable, consistent, achievable, and understandable.

## **2. Equipment**

The equipment for the reserve-component must be relevant to the task of the organization that it supports. The need to keep the equipment operationally ready is of paramount concern. Therefore, the equipment must be:

- Relevant to the organization's task
- Operationally maintained with a minimum amount of maintenance time
- Not of a type which is time-intensive with respect to training or which requires a high degree of technical training and sustainment

## **3. Training**

Training should be considered the most critical item for a reserve-component, since time limitations put pressure on conducting quality-level training. With this limitation in mind, we can conclude that training needs to be standardized to maximize the effective use of available training time. Organizations must have training that has been evaluated and determined to be relevant to the tasks of the organization of force structure. For example, infantry squads must have standardized tasks that are universally established throughout the military structure. The training standard of an active-duty infantry squad should be the same as the reserve-component infantry squad. Training

time for a professional organization needs to be maximized to insure that all available time is utilized for mission-essential tasks.

Although reserve-components historically conduct training at intervals within a training year (e.g., one weekend a month, two weeks a year), the level of proficiency correlates directly to the amount of time the unit actually trains for any given task. Bureaucratic requirements, though necessary, do not enhance the training-proficiency level of a unit. Therefore bureaucratic requirements should be minimized and training time maximized to accomplish the organization's war-fighting capabilities.

A critical element for a reserve-component is that the force structure be utilized to determine mission tasks, which are broken into two categories: sustainment training and mobilization training. Sustainment training includes tasks that can be trained to proficiency during reserve status, or peacetime mode. Mobilization training tasks must be trained to proficiency immediately prior to the organization being committed to a combat environment. This time period relates directly to the threat level faced by the nation under evaluation. Nations that have a high threat level usually must minimize the amount of mobilization time in order to commit their reserve forces as quickly as possible. This means that sustainment training is increased to accomplish the tasks that would be normally completed during the mobilization phase. Conversely, a country that has a lower threat level would most likely reduce sustainment training, increasing its mobilization training only in case of imminent war. As a result, nations can invert the time factors respectively, based on threat levels. This ability allows a country to tailor its

reserve forces to meet the needs of the national threat. A review of the standards for professional training includes:

- Standardized training that is universally used within the nation's defense structure
- Available training time that is maximized to accomplish war-fighting tasks
- Two categories of war-fighting tasks:
  - Sustainment: Those tasks to be accomplished during peace time
  - Mobilization: Those tasks not trained on during peace time that must be achieved prior to deployment into combat operations

#### **4. Leadership**

The next area of concern for any professional military organization is the quality of its leadership. Depending on the organization and the nation's military structure, leadership can be found at various levels within the force. All militaries have some sort of an officer corps (leadership base), which provides direction for the organization. Several military systems contain a non-commissioned officer corps, which decentralizes the leadership to the lowest levels. Regardless of the nation's preference, for the leadership to be considered professional, Huntington's tenets of the officer corps<sup>25</sup> should be considered. These tenets are:

- (1) the organizing, equipping, and training of the force
- (2) the planning of its activities and
- (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat

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<sup>25</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press: 1985) 11.

This explanation establishes the dynamics of the officer profession. However, it does not clearly quantify the variables needed. Huntington organizes the variables into three categories of characteristics significant to a military professional. The categories are "the expertise of officership, the responsibility of officership, and the corporate character of officership."<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, Huntington indicates how an officer obtains the skills needed to be considered a professional military officer:

The skill of the officer is neither a craft (which is primarily mechanical) nor an art (which requires unique and nontransferable talent). It is instead an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training.<sup>27</sup>

This skill is formulated through years of military schooling in the operational arts, as well as through the practical experience achieved by trial and error: "The officer possesses intellectualized skill, mastery of which requires intense study."<sup>28</sup> Therefore, the military professional officer cannot be considered a true professional based on education alone. Although the educational aspects of the officer are critical, education must be accompanied by practical experience.

The responsibility of an officer is an understanding that the officer is held accountable for his actions within the profession:

The employment of his expertise promiscuously for his own advantage would wreck the fabric of society – his responsibility is the military security of his client-society.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 11, 14, and 16.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 14-15.

For the most part, the officer's motivation is not economic in nature, but involves a commitment to the profession of arms. Within the profession itself, there are guidelines and structures that clearly spell out what these responsibilities entail.

The corporate characteristics of officership are uniquely different from that of other professions. Military professionals must initially achieve their status within the organization through education in the skills that make them officers. However, the military professionals usually restrict their activities to that of the military society itself:

The professional world of the officer tends to encompass an unusually high proportion of his activities. He normally lives and works apart from the rest of society; physically and socially he probably has fewer nonprofessional contacts than most other professional men.<sup>30</sup>

This corporate nature sets the military professional off from the rest of society and therefore clearly points to the standards set by the profession. The active-duty officer is without a doubt a professional within the field of military operations. The level of training, the various degrees of expertise, along with commitment and dedication are definitely apparent in an active-duty officer. However, when we look at reserve-component officers, we see an element quite different from their active-duty counterparts.

The citizen-soldier, who is "part-time" does not match the model outlined by Huntington. However, with regard to expertise, the reserve-component officer should achieve the same level of formal military training as his active-duty counterpart. Most military organizations expose their officers to the same level of formal training regardless of component.

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 16.

Furthermore, with regard to expertise, reserve officers should maintain their skills by performing their respective military duties on a consistent basis (most reserve-components conduct training at least once a month). Therefore, if the officer corps of a reserve-component is trained and gains experience through a set, regimented training program, it will reasonably achieve Huntington's tenets of responsibility and expertise. However, the reserve officer corps may lack the extreme corporate mentality of the active-duty force. Of course, it will also lack the extreme degrees of corporativeness that can only be achieved in a closed military society, a society which can be viewed negatively since it is disconnected from society. Corporativeness is the fundamental difference between an active-duty and reserve force.

Most reserve officers attempt to remain up-to-date, through military business, readings, and volunteer duty on their personal time. However, level of expertise must be individually evaluated. To say that a reserve infantry officer does not reach the same level of expertise as his or her active-duty counterpart is a fair and equitable assessment. However, if one compares an engineer reserve officer (who has a compatible civilian skill in construction) to his active-duty counterpart (who is subjected to post details and other non-engineer missions), the scales tip in favor of the reserve-component officer. Since the reserve officer spends more time exercising the skills of construction than he would while on active military status, his reserve career is complemented by his civilian career. In addition, with the advent of the Internet and E-mail, the reserve officer can access military homepages (e.g., the Early Bird, RAND Corp., and many other military-related sites) to remain up-to-date on military trends and developments. Therefore, the level of

expertise that Huntington promotes needs to be evaluated on an individual and career-track basis.

To review, certain variables are needed to consider a reserve-component "professional." Table 3 lists these essential elements of what constitutes a professional reserve-component. Utilizing this framework as a measuring stick, we can determine the level of professionalism within a reserve-component.

ORGANIZATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Command and control, beginning with the civilian authority (republic or democratic system) which flows to the military, then down to the sub-organizations within the force structure</li> <li>- A structure that is consistent with other equivalent military organizations of that country's military force structure</li> <li>- The structure must be capable of accomplishing an assigned war-fighting mission</li> <li>- Clearly defined organizational structure: who, what position, what duty</li> <li>- Must be obtainable, realistic and achievable</li> </ul>
EQUIPMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Relevant to the organization's task</li> <li>- Maintenance time should be kept to a minimum in order to keep the equipment operational, so that valuable training time is not lost to maintenance</li> <li>- Of a variety that is not time intensive of training and requires a high degree of technical training and sustainment, thereby creating an unrealistic training time requirement</li> <li>- Equipment should be the same as its active-duty counterpart (modernization).</li> </ul>
TRAINING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Standardized training that is universally used within the nation's defense structure</li> <li>- Available training time is maximized to accomplish war-fighting tasks</li> <li>- The war-fighting tasks are identified and are broken into two categories <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sustainment: These tasks to be accomplished during peace time</li> <li>- Mobilization: Additional tasks that must be trained to standard prior to deployment into combat operations</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
LEADERSHIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Responsible</li> <li>- Expertise (Training/Experience)</li> </ul>

Table 3. Key Elements to determine a Professional Reserve-component



### **III. ESTONIAN CASE: THE FUTURE OF PROFESSIONAL RESERVE COMPONENTS**

#### **A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SOCIAL CONDITION**

Estonians identify themselves as European, a claim that is supported by their culture, architecture, and demeanor. Estonia is the northernmost of the Baltic nations, which places it at the northern reaches of the European Continent.

Estonia's past has been marked with successive bloody empires that battled for and conquered land and people. Throughout its history, Estonia has been subjected to multiple conquests from early German Barons, Danes, Swedes, Poles, Russian Czars, Nazi Germany, and twice by the Soviet Union. Subjected to over "seven hundred years of oppression,"<sup>31</sup> Estonian society has maintained its sense of identity, autonomy, and a desire for independence instilled within its ethos. This most notable latter attribute of Estonian society makes it ripe not only for independence, but also for a form of government that is conducive to individual rights and the rule of law. Through its many years of oppression (most recently under the Soviet Union), Estonians came to understand the value of freedom and the protection of individual rights. Consequently they are understandably concerned about the future of their national security.

Estonia gained independence from the Soviet Union on September 6, 1991. It then adopted its former constitution from before the occupation. On June 28, 1992, Estonia proclaimed that it had been occupied and was not a true member of the Soviet Union.

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<sup>31</sup> John O' Brien, *Estonia, the Guide* Tallinn: Revalia Publishin Ltd, 1993

This significant event announced to the world the emergence of the Estonian state. Assessing the state of Estonia's society and its relationship with the republican principles is a difficult matter. The Soviet Union occupied Estonia for over forty years. Realistically speaking, "65% of the population, all those between the ages 15-64"<sup>32</sup> were born during the occupation, and did not undergo the freedoms experienced between 1918 and 1938. Therefore, the morals and mores of the Soviet Union are embedded in the social fabric. According to COL (Ret) Guderjohn, the former Military Liaison Team Chief, "It will take a minimum of three generations of Estonians to break the grip of the insidious nature of the Soviet system of society."<sup>33</sup>

This understanding of Estonia's societal situation is a popular belief among many U.S. personnel who come in contact with Estonian society, including myself. These social norms cannot change overnight, and it will require time and nurturing for them to move towards a social climate conducive to a republican society. Commenting on Estonian social capital, the Estonian Military Attaché to Washington, LTC Tammalia, indicated that Estonians are "lazy about their participation in the Government activities (which is a legacy from Soviet times), and that elections are attracting approximately between 60-70% of the eligible voters."<sup>34</sup>

Although I understand Tammalia's concerns regarding apathy among the voting population of Estonia, I would counter that the United States, which is considered a

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<sup>32</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 1996-1997*, Washington / London, Brassey's, 1996, 133.

<sup>33</sup> Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, e-mail, Tallinn Estonia.

<sup>34</sup> Tammela, LTC Estonian Military Attaché to the United States. Interviewed by author, 22 Sept 1998, Washington D.C.

consolidated democracy, only realizes a conservative 45-48% voter turn out in a given year. This is considerably less than the Estonian level of participation. However, Tammalia's interpretation of the impact on Estonian society by the Soviet occupation raises an important issue and should be taken into consideration with relationship to Estonia's transition to a republican society.

With respect to participation in the democratic process, the RAND Corporation, which provides democratic ratings for most countries, indicates that Estonia "in 1983 [Soviet era] had a democratic rating of 0.0 and in 1993 showed a marked increase with a democratic rating of 75.0."<sup>35</sup>

There are those in the political science arena who believe that the true mark of a nation's growth in the direction of democracy is the transfer of power from one political party to another. Estonia has shown that it can change governments successfully and without violence since the "Estonian government has turned over from the Pro Patria Coalition to the Koonderakond coalition in 1995."<sup>36</sup>

Another critical element is the involvement of the population in the democratic process. "Social capital within the nation is not very large, but outside of the country many Estonians seem to gather together (those who escaped Estonia at the end of World War II - war refugees)."<sup>37</sup> This reluctance to gather in groups at home may be due to the influence of the former Soviet Union, which did not encourage groups to congregate.

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<sup>35</sup> *The RAND Corporation*. Unknown Copyright. Available [Online]: <<http://www.rand.org/>> [19 April 1998].

<sup>36</sup> Tammela, LTC Estonian Military Attaché to the United States. Interviewed by author, 22 Sept 1998, Washington D.C..

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

However, a key indicator of the Estonian culture is that those Estonians who are allowed freedoms in other countries gather together in great numbers to support not only Estonia, but to keep their cultural traditions alive. The potential for social capital within Estonian society clearly exists, but needs time to develop.

The NDL provides a strong example of such social capital. Prior to World War II "the Kaitseliit [NDL], with its special organizations had 100,000 members. At that time was one tenth of the population of Estonia and presented expressive proof of the nation's will to defend itself."<sup>38</sup>

"During June 1940 the occupation by the Soviet Union, the Kaitseliit [NDL] was one of the first organizations to be prohibited, and the members of the Kaitseliit [NDL] became victims of especially cruel repression."<sup>39</sup>

Shortly after the occupation ended, the NDL has manifested a rapid resurgence by "uniting over 8,000 Kaitseliit [NDL] members and together with the special organization there are over 12,000 members."<sup>40</sup>

The NDL is a clear example of social capital, since its structure contains organizations from various segments of society. The "Women's Home Defense, Young Eagles, and Home Daughters"<sup>41</sup> are organizations similar to the U.S. Boy Scouts, and Girl Scouts respectively. This represents approximately .008 percent of the "1,436,558 (July 1997 est.)"<sup>42</sup> Estonian population, and this percentage is growing.

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<sup>38</sup> *Kaitseliit*, 1997, Estonian Defense League "Pamphlet". Tallinn Estonia: Author.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. Author

<sup>42</sup> *Joint Contact Team Program*. 21 April 1998. Available [Online].  
<<http://www.eucom.mil/programs/jctp/>> [22 April 1998].

These organizations teach social skills and are community based within each "Malev" (a country district, of which there are 15). This unique example illustrates that fact that when afforded the right to gather (in this case for the nation's defense) the Estonians are quite capable of building social capital. As Estonians become more comfortable with their new freedoms, the expansion of groups and organizations will support the social base needed for any Republican society.

Additionally, Estonians have begun to flock to other types of social and cultural organizations. Within Estonia today, there are "nine cultural societies, twenty-seven environmental, or ecological organizations, four folk culture groups, twenty-six literary societies, fifteen museums, and forty-two people type organizations."<sup>43</sup>

The existence of these organizations indicates that Estonian social capital is quite capable of growing and providing the impetus to shape the nation's development through involvement in organizations, groups, and ultimately concerned communities. It can also be contended that in addition to social evolvement a democratic nation needs a well-educated population, since a well-informed populace understands the dynamics of the democratic political process. Being informed, educated voters can express their views through their votes. The RAND Corporation indicated that "Estonia has a 96% adult literacy rate, and that on the average Estonians obtain nine years of schooling."<sup>44</sup> This literacy rate is considered substantial since most countries listed in the same report indicated adult literacy rates in the 75-80% range. Additionally, Estonians pride

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<sup>43</sup> *Estonian World Wide Web*. Copyright Unknown. Available [Online] <[http://www.ee/www/Culture\\_and\\_Society/welcome.html](http://www.ee/www/Culture_and_Society/welcome.html)> [26 October 1998].

<sup>44</sup> *The RAND Corporation*. Unknown Copyright. Available [Online]: <<http://www.rand.org/>> [19 April 1998].

themselves in hosting one of the oldest universities in Europe. The Tartu University in Tartu Estonia provides a host of higher education courses, including medicine, engineering, social science, and astronomy are but a few of the subjects offered by this prestigious university. The city of Tartu revolves around the university and prides itself in being a center for learning and academic development.

Throughout the country there has been an increase in the number of higher educational institutions since Soviet occupation:

In 1980, during Soviet times there were six (6) higher educational institutions within Estonia. Shortly after the occupation, the number increased significantly in 1993 to twenty-two (22). As of 1997, there are thirty-five (35) higher educational institutions located in Estonia. It should be noted that in 1995, higher education could be obtained in one vocational educational institution.<sup>45</sup>

Pride associated with education encourages members of society to continue to develop educationally. This attitude towards education is deeply engrained in the ethos of Estonian society and promises to yield future generations great success in the area of higher education. As the walls of oppression have been lowered many Estonians have seized the opportunity to continue their studies in foreign countries. This clearly shows the Estonia's desire to improve its educational systems.

Economics also play an important part in the social arena. The interdependence of economic and society is inherently reflected in the political process. As we have seen historically, the independent citizen is concerned about not only his or her rights (individual freedoms), but also about the security of property within a democracy.

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<sup>45</sup> *Estonian Higher Educational Institutions*. Copyright Unknown, Available [Online] <[http://www.stat.ee/wwwstat/content/I\\_S\\_SL\\_UK/1.html](http://www.stat.ee/wwwstat/content/I_S_SL_UK/1.html)> [20 October 1998].

Democracies are inherently linked to their economic stability. Events in Asia clearly showed how closely government stability is tied to economic stability and confidence. Estonian economic initiatives can easily be called aggressive in nature and forward-thinking:

Estonian government has pursued an ambitious program of market reforms and stabilization measures, which is rapidly transforming the economy. Three years after independence and two years after the introduction of the kroon (Estonian currency), Estonians are beginning to reap tangible benefits; inflation though still high, was brought down to about 2% per month in the second half 1994; production declines have bottomed out with estimated growth of 4% in 1994; and living standards are rising.<sup>46</sup>

The Estonian economy had been the most efficient, by Soviet standards, during the occupation (especially in areas such as agriculture). Although it still suffered during that time period because it was not afforded the opportunity to meet its full potential. However even before independence, Estonians were focused on posturing themselves for economic reforms and linking with the West. "Estonia's foreign trade has shifted rapidly from East to West; the Western industrialized countries now account for two-thirds of foreign trade."<sup>47</sup> Estonian economic planners within government institutions have not been the only source of improvement to the economic conditions of Estonia. The private sector has shown marked improvement since independence.

The private sector is growing rapidly; the share of the state enterprises in the economy has steadily declined, and by late 1994 accounted for only 40% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 1996-1997*, Washington/London, Brassey's, 1996.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

Estonia has been credited with being one of the first nations coming out of the Soviet Union to establish a legitimate currency, the kroon, in "August 1992."<sup>49</sup> "Kroons are tied to the German Deutschmark at a fixed rate of 8 to 1"<sup>50</sup> which shows the progressive and international foresight projected by the Estonian financial planners.

With the economy showing signs of long-term improvement, the Estonian standard of living slowly rising, and confidence in economic reforms the Estonian economic stability is on the increase. This allows the development of a society that can experience economic independence from government controls. This economic situation eliminates the need for dependence on the government. The ability to exercise economic freedom frees the society from governmental control and separates the political process from economic realities. Although it is impossible to completely sever the ties between a government and its economy, the less controls imposed on the economy by the government, the better the conditions for the democratic process. However, the economy must remain healthy and show signs of growth and stability for security within the society and confidence in the political system to exist.

The comprehensive overview of Estonian society shows that it has a unique potential for social capital, economic progressiveness, and an educated populace striving for greater information in the academic realm. All these factors indicate a society that is well-suited for republican ideas. This also shows that the social fabric of Estonia is also conducive to having a citizen-soldier military. The NDL is evidence of this propensity.

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.



Still, in the early stages of organizational development the willingness of the members of the Estonian society to embrace a once outlawed organization (during Soviet times) shows the social base commitment to the nation.

Based on the items I have presented, I feel that the social base of Estonia appears able to support the existence of a reserve component. Although still feeling the effects of the former Soviet Union, the progressive nature of the Estonians will provide the means for this end. The NDL's early advances clearly reflect community support and the commitment of the populace to the security of the Estonian State. Time remains the enemy as the Estonians rebuild their entire way of life. The military is only one element of the overall dynamics of Estonian society, but the real world security concerns confronting Estonia insure that this issue will remain high on the priority list. In conclusion, the Estonian society is ripe for the citizen-soldier concept, and the NDL appears to be the tool to this end, with respect to the Estonian society's embrace of this organization so soon after independence.

## **B. GOVERNMENTAL EVOLUTION**

To understand any country, it is critical that we become familiar with its system of government and institutions. The values of a society are normally contained within its constitution, which should state the fundamental value system, and how the governmental institutions operate.

The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia was proclaimed on February 24, 1918, and the country was forcefully occupied by the Soviets in 1938. The Constitution was

reestablished by referendum on June 28,1992, and adopted the following chapters presented in Table 4:

Chapter I	General Provision
Chapter II	Fundamental Rights, Freedoms and Duties
Chapter III	The People
Chapter IV	The Riigikogu (Parliament)
Chapter V	The President of the Republic
Chapter VI	The Government of the Republic
Chapter VII	Legislation
Chapter VIII	Finance and the State Budget
Chapter IX	Foreign Relations and International Treaties
Chapter X	National Defense
Chapter XI	The State Audit Office
Chapter XII	The Legal Chancellor
Chapter XIII	The Courts
Chapter XIV	Local Governments
Chapter XV	Amendment of the Constitution
	The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Implementation Act

Table 4. Chapters of the Estonian Constitution

The Government of Estonia has, through legislation, established the legal base for the rule of law within the elements of the Constitution. The focus of this chapter is on the legal aspect of the Constitution and governmental institutions that legitimize present military organizations. The Estonian Constitution specifies "National Defense"<sup>51</sup> under Chapter X. Chapter X clearly outlines the authority of the civilian government during times of peace and war. Chapter X Section 127 states: "the supreme commander of national defense is the President of the Republic,"<sup>52</sup> and establishes civilian authority over the military. Chapter X Section 127 also establishes a National Defense Council as

<sup>51</sup> Estonian Constitution 3 November 1996, Available [Online]: <webmaster@rk.ee> [23 May 1998]

<sup>52</sup> Ibid

an advisory body with membership provided by law. There is also a proviso, which delineates leadership within the Defense structure during times of peace and war:

The Estonian Defense Forces and national defense organizations shall be led by the Commander of the Defense Forces in peace-time, and by the Commander in Chief of the Defense Forces in war-time. The Commander and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Forces shall be appointed to and released from office by the Riigikogu (Parliament), on the proposal of the President of the Republic.<sup>53</sup>

This Chapter of the Constitution clearly outlines: a) the authority of the civilian government over the military, b) provisions for leadership during times of war and peace, c) procedures of declaration of war, d) emergency mobilization against an aggression (with time constraints), e) threats to the Estonian constitutional order, f) restrictions of rights and freedoms of citizens during times of war or national emergency, g) time periods when a resolution has to be reached by the Riigikogu. These provisions are the essential elements of the establishment of the military and its operation under civilian authority.

The legislation authorizing the legitimacy of a reserve military structure is found in the "Kaitseliit [NDL] Statutes, which was confirmed by the President of the Republic on May 2, 1931."<sup>54</sup> It firmly outlines the missions of the NDL which include:

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, e-mail, Tallinn Estonia, and in person 23 Sept 1998.

- Assistance to legal authorities in defending Estonian Constitutional Regime and security of citizens
- Participation in disaster relief operations
- Military Training and education of its members
- Enforcement of Patriotic and National feelings in citizens
- "Execution of other missions given to Kaitseliit [NDL] by legal means."<sup>55</sup>

These statutes formally put into effect in 1931, were modified in 1995 to add:

Kaitseliit [NDL] is a voluntary association with military structure which owns weapons and conducts military exercises - Peacetime National Defense Law, par. 8, section 2, confirmed on 6 February 1995.<sup>56</sup>

Clearly, the legislation that authorizes the legal establishment of the NDL exists.

These institutional frameworks provide the Estonian defense establishment with a reserve force. However, the NDL is a volunteer organization that does not get substantial support from the government. Its volunteers receive no compensation, and for the most part purchase and maintain their own equipment aside from the mere stocks provided by the government. Although legislation is in place to support the NDL legally, no material substance is provided to integrate the organization within the Estonian defensive posture.

Therefore, this volunteer organization is fundamentally on its own and obtains monetary support through its own devices. Some means of gaining revenue may even be considered questionable. Although, the institutional framework exists, it lacks the required monetary support for creating the readiness levels necessary for it to become an

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

active part of the Estonian defense community. Yet, organizationally, the NDL is expected to contribute to defense activities in times of emergency and maintains a chain of command within the defense structure (which is currently under revision).

The gradient level of involvement by civilian authority over the military, contains several key areas that can help us determine if Estonia's defense structure is truly living up to the legal parameters of the Constitution through civilian control and oversight. When interviewed on several issues concerning the involvement of civilians in defense policymaking, Tammela clearly stated that civilian involvement exists within Estonia:

The military is totally under the purview of civilian policy at the highest levels. Civilians are involved at every level, but at the local level there are some separations, due to a lack of clearly defined roles.<sup>57</sup>

Although at times it appears that there is friction over military policy and programs between the military leaders and the civilian authority (which is the proper balance), there is no doubt that the civil authority remains superior to the military. An issue which best demonstrates this friction relates to the recent debates within the Estonian Defense community over commissioned officer education:

The Ministry of Defense and General Staff have a difference of opinion on the subject of officer education, but in the end, if both sides listen to each other, they can come up with a comprehensive program. The key ingredients of each, political issues and tactical employment are both needed. In the final analysis a mix of each will improve the leadership training within the Estonian military.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Tammela, LTC Estonian Military Attaché to the United States. Interviewed by author, 22 Sept. 1998, in person Washington D.C..

<sup>58</sup> Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, e-mail, Tallinn Estonia, and in person 23 Sept 1998.

At this time there is an agreement by both the Ministry of Defense and General Staff that officer training should focus on professionalism. At this time, there is a committee reviewing the aspects of officer training.

As the Estonian defense establishment wrestles with critical policies and procedures related to operational issues, differences of opinion between military leaders and their civilian counterparts can be expected. As long as this arena does not become adversarial, the civilian-military relationship will be a healthy environment for the creation of future policies. However, one thing that has been lacking within the Estonian Ministry is a large number of civilians with an understanding of military management procedures. Understanding this shortfall, the civilian leadership within Estonia has taken positive steps to rectify the situation. The Estonian Ministry of Defense has sent members of the Ministry to foreign democratic countries to learn about subjects ranging from the military budgeting procedures (Programming Planning Budgeting System - PPBS) to civil military relations and international security courses.

This comprehensive effort is designed to train civilians in defense management matters so that "soldiers in civilian clothing" do not inundate the Estonian Ministry of Defense. On the same issue, the civilians running the military must be uniquely aware of security issues, procurement, and policy matters, and must be the conduit between the current civilian-elected leadership and the military. The civilian leadership within Estonia has shown great foresight in this area, since currently there is a member of the Ministry of Defense and a member of the General Staff attending the Civil-Military Relations and International Security program at the Naval Postgraduate School located in

Monterey California. In addition, there is another member of the Ministry of Defense scheduled to attend in the 1999 course. By taking advantage of programs of this nature, the Ministry will employ civilians who understand the dynamics of the defense community.

Another essential indicator that confirms civilian authority is the budget. Defense expenditure was for "1995 \$34.1 million (exchange rate conversion), almost 5% of the overall State budget and 1.5% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)."<sup>59</sup> With a budget of "revenues: \$643 million, and expenditures: \$639 million"<sup>60</sup> the resources for improvement are just not available. However, through creative measures and foreign support in the form of weapons, training and materials from the West, the Estonian Defense Forces seem to be improving their capabilities. A salient point to derive from this information is that the Estonian military budget is controlled by the civilian authority, which is mandated to maintain a balanced budget. Although, in recent years, there has been an effort to raise the defense budget, the Riigikogu (Parliament) has not focused significantly on the military.

Another way to examine the civilian oversight within the Estonian Defense structure is to look at how the organization itself establishes a clear chain of command. This chain should begin with civilian authority (President) in accordance with the Constitution, and flow smoothly to the operational units. As can be seen in Figure 3 the flow goes from the President directly to the Commander in Chief of Defense forces, then it flows in two directions: 1) To the Defense League (NDL), and 2) General Staff of

Defense forces and from there to the operational units. There is another flow, which appears to be for appropriations and policy issues. This flow begins with the Riigikogu (Parliament) and goes to the Ministry of Defense, then to the Department of Defense. From there, issues go directly to the Defense League and General Staff of Defense forces. Therefore, within the Estonian National Defense structure, there are two clearly outlined paths of command and control. One process within the chain represents a command relationship and the other indicates appropriations and policy. All segments of the Ministry are led by civilians whether they are elected officials or government workers (bureaucracy). Then civilian-created military policy goes to the General Staff for implementation in the operational units. This leaves little doubt that the civilian authority leads the Estonian military.

Contained in Figure 4 is the organization structure of the Ministry of Defense. This clearly shows the roles that the civilian authority assumes within the defense community. There is a Department of Budget and Finance, which controls budgetary matters and includes an accounting office. Also within the structure is the Department of Military Service, which oversees over education, mobilization, and military service. Although still evolving, the structure clearly defines civilian authority over the military, and its involvement with defense matters.

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<sup>59</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 1996-1997*, Washington / London, Brassey's, 1996, p 134.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.







Figure 3. Organization and Levels of the National Defense



**Organization of the Estonian Ministry of Defense 1998**

Figure 4 Estonian Ministry of Defense

## **C. KEY ISSUES IN ESTONIAN FORCE STRUCTURE**

### **1. External Threats**

When looking at Estonia's potential threat, the most likely candidate is Russia to the East. As Russia transitioned from the former Soviet Union, it has experience, a military coup, economic instability, food shortages, and high levels of unemployment. Russia cannot be considered stable, since there are no short-term solutions to these and many other internal problems. With hard-liners like Alexander Lebed waiting to succeed Boris Yeltsin, Russia's internal problems can easily translate into external aggression. To date, relations between Estonia and Russia can be considered strained, since critical issues concerning border locations and treatment of Russian nationals within Estonia

continue to create an atmosphere of mutual distrust. Estonians continue to fear Russia because of sheer size, recent historical occupation, and Russian aggressive attitudes towards Estonia and the Baltic nations. Russian security concerns towards the Kaliningrad enclave (Oblast) remain high and therefore it watches the west very closely. As a result, Russian troop strength along the border remains at high levels. "Recent large scale Airborne operations conducted sixty kilometers from the Estonian border (facing west) sent waves of concern through the Estonian government."<sup>61</sup>

Additionally, twenty eight percent of Estonia's population is Russian. For the most part, the Estonian government has been benevolent towards granting Russians Estonian citizenship, but many retain their Russian national connection. This creates an internal security concern, with external implications. Any negative issues concerning Estonian-Russians are going to attract the attention of its eastern neighbor. This internal security problem takes the form of a potential "Fifth Column" which can actively work against Estonian authority through subversion and providing information to mother Russia. This unique problem cannot be solved easily since protection of Russian citizens within Estonia is an implied tenet of the Estonian Constitution.

Although there have been border and fishing disputes with Latvia to the south, these have simply been viewed as growing pains. With cooperation in other ventures including military cooperation like BALTBAT (Baltic Battalion), Latvia can not be considered a threat to Estonian sovereignty. Other regional actors like Finland and

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<sup>61</sup> Toom, Aivar 2LT, Estonian Defense Force (General Staff). Interviewed by author, 24 May 1998, in person, Monterey, California.

Sweden have provided considerable assistance to Estonia and cannot be considered a military or political threat. Therefore, with a sizable military, unstable government, and large-scale domestic concerns, Russia is Estonia's paramount menace to national sovereignty.

## **2. Domestic Considerations**

The most significant issues revealed in this research is that Estonia, as a nation, is moving progressively, and aggressively, towards a consolidated democratic environment capable of supporting the institutions of a republican society. The key elements of this can be found in the society and governmental institutions. With respect to a reserve component, this research has found several issues that merit further consideration and study.

Within the Estonian society, it is clear that social capital is on the rise. Diverse groups and organizations are forming in all spectrums of society. These groups are actively participating in events that were not encouraged during the occupation. This clearly points to a social base capable of group participation, and involved with its surroundings. Social capital is critical to a republican form of government since it indicates that people are involved. Although not developed to its fullest potential, the fact that Estonians are beginning to utilize their freedoms is a clear sign of progress. Time will be the issue, since the wounds of Soviet oppression will take many years to heal. However, since individual liberties are somewhat new to the vast majority of Estonians who where born and raised under Soviet rule, the progress seen to date is impressively encouraging.

Another indicator of a progressive republican society is the education of the populace. As we have clearly seen, the Estonians place a high value on education. The increase in the number of institutions of higher learning shows the strength of commitment by the society and the governmental institutions that support them. An educated man is less likely to allow the yoke of oppression to be placed around his neck. Only through an informed civil society can a consolidated democratic system of government successfully thrive.

Economically speaking, Estonia's aggressive move forward, with the innovative movement of businesses into the private sector, provides the economic stability needed for a democratic nation to effectively. Through a conscious energetic effort to establish trade with the West, Estonia has established itself as an up-and-coming economic player within the international community. This is evident from the fact that two-thirds of the foreign trade is conducted with the industrialized West. As a result, this economic stability provides the freedom needed by any democratic society. Through economic independence, the civil society is capable of making rational choices within the democratic framework, free of influence and controls by governmental institutions. This leverage has shifted effectively to the Estonian population.

As for the governmental institutions contained within Estonia, the decision to adopt the original Constitution from 1918 not only provides for the legitimacy of Estonia, but it sets up two interesting premises. First, it invalidates the Soviet government during the time of occupation. Second, it utilizes a comprehensive document produced at a time when national interest flourished. This duality allows the governmental institutions to

move onto other more pressing issues and using the existing framework of Estonian values, and avoid "recreating the wheel".

The Estonian Constitution contains a chapter devoted strictly to "National Defense" (Chapter X) which sets up the parameters of a legitimized military within Estonian society. The Constitution contains the critical elements needed to provide for a civilian chain of command, and outlines the actions of the governmental institutions during peacetime and war. Although in need of some fine-tuning, the document is comprehensive and establishes the authority of the civilians over the military.

The gradient leverage of civilian authority is still new to the Estonian military organizational framework. This is a direct impact of the fact that many within the military structure have served with the Soviet military. As time creates distance from "the old ways", and situations that lend themselves to compromise and communication arise, this will eventually work itself out.

By looking at the key ingredients of civilian leverage over the military, we clearly see that the civilian authority controls the budget, establishes the leadership doctrine, and chooses the military leaders of high posts. As the boundaries of responsibility between the military and civilian authority are established, a more effective and efficient comprehensive bureaucratic system will develop. Although there may never be a clear "cookie cutter" approach to solving problems confronting the Estonian military institutions. The civilian leadership will always maintain ultimate control.

The Estonians appear to be experimenting with a centralized reserve structure. During the summer of 1998, the first "muster" was conducted, which provided a

manpower pool for the active service. This system being too new to determine its effectiveness this research will focus on the NDL as a reserve structure.

The NDL is a legitimate and recognized organization within the Estonian defense structure. Estonian law provides for the NDL to "assist legal authorities in defending Estonian Constitutional Regime and Security of citizens."<sup>62</sup> Therefore it is a legal organization capable of conducting military operations for the defense of the Estonian State. This means that during a time of mobilization the NDL will be needed to defend the nation. The law provides for this requirement.

When the variables outlined in previous chapters are applied to the NDL, the NDL reveals several positives as well as negatives. The first positive aspect is that the organization shows signs of the citizen-soldier concept. That members of the community willingly volunteer their time and effort to the defense of the Estonian State is clearly the hallmark of the citizen-soldier concept. This civil involvement and sense of responsibility has a "win-win" effect for Estonian society in that it provides for the defense of the nation and produces the social capital needed to sustain a democratic society.

The second positive result is that individual and small unit competition reveals that the Estonian citizen-soldier is capable of maintaining an effective level of combat readiness. However a standardized level of readiness must be established to insure that training is conducted to achieve this goal.

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<sup>62</sup> Larry W. Guderjohn, COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author. 20 April 1998, e-mail, Tallinn Estonia, and in person 23 Sept 1998

The third positive aspect of the Estonian military is its leadership. Although it is experiencing readjustment pains while moving from the Soviet style to a more Western philosophy, the senior level leaders are focusing on the future. By sending members of the military to Western nations for leadership training, the Estonian military is learning the leadership tools of professional service. These aspects will take time, and within the NDL it will be even longer in coming, but the elements are being developed and put into place now. This will provide the Estonian military the capability of providing dynamic leaders at the needed levels.

A negative aspect of the NDL is that the organization may be too much of a social organization and not a professional military unit. It is not capable of conducting combat operations at the battalion (approximately 500 man size units) level or higher. Though the Malev is about the organizational size of a United States Army Brigade, it contains within its structure, groups like the Women's League, the Young Eagle, and other non-combatant groups (band, etc.). Therefore, within this Brigade size organization the unit that can be considered combat-capable is about Battalion-size (this will vary between Malev to Malev since demographics and population dictate available manpower). This constitutes the war-fighting apparatus within the Malev. Getting through the organizational layers within the Malev and fielding the war-fighting asset may be a difficult venture. This would be particularly difficult if the Malev's combat assets are to be used in conjunction with other (active duty) Estonian military assets in support of national military objectives.



A second negative aspect is the problem with the organization of the combat assets within the Malev. My research indicated that the units contained in the Malev do not mirror their active-duty counterparts. Organizationally, their structure may be incapable of performing the same level of tasks, and their relative combat power may vary from unit to unit based on formations and equipment. This creates a conglomeration of units with varying levels of combat capabilities, resulting in a command and control problem of the highest order in terms of national defense strategy.

The resourcing of the NDL is accomplished through its own initiatives. The Estonian central government provides little monetary assistance to the NDL, yet the NDL has presence within the General Staff and Defense establishments. This could create a quasi-Mafia style organization if not monitored closely. "Bake sales" and "raffles" are insufficient for resourcing a combat organization. Therefore, more innovative (and possibly less legal) means of resourcing could be sought. The potential for misconduct is there. In many former Eastern bloc countries, we have seen the rise of organized crime and the involvement of people with military training in criminal activities.

The equipping of the NDL is difficult to do within the constraints of the Estonian defense budget. Although there are efforts to provide new weapons through the United States Security Assistance to Estonia, the current situation lends itself to becoming a logistic nightmare during combat operations. With the various types of weapons and equipment currently in the NDL inventory, a national standardized logistic system is nearly impossible. The Estonian leadership has not been able to solve the logistic

problem to date. Although the leadership has determined this to be a significant problem, the solutions are years from being achieved within the current budgetary limitations

The NDL's training suffers the same fate as its active duty counterpart in that it lacks the standardized training unit commanders needed to maintain an elevated level of combat readiness. Training differs between units, and different techniques are used based on the training experience of the unit cadre and commanders. This creates a planning and deployment nightmare, since units trained by different standards will not operate as similar entities and will cause serious command and control problems. Although I understand a standardized training manual is under development, one does not exist at this time. Therefore determining sustainment and mobilization criteria for training is not presently possible.

The conclusion of this case study is that based on the indicators that I have outlined, Estonia is progressively moving forward towards a consolidated democracy. If this current trend continues, the social base will be conducive to a reserve component made up of citizen-soldiers. As the society moves further away from the Soviet influence, it will develop the key components for being a successful democratic state. Therefore, with limited resources, a social base that has shown progressive signs of embracing republican principles, the atmosphere for the citizen-soldier and its advantages are real possibilities for the future.

#### **D. CURRENT DEFENSE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION**

The idea of a professional reserve component is extremely attractive to many of the newly independent post-Soviet states. Many of those states are faced with economic, political, cultural, and social turmoil. For the most part the militaries within these Eastern European countries have remained docile during the transitional phase, and have been subjected to extensive draw downs and cutbacks due to economic concerns. Since a professional reserve component can open up new dynamics to military defensive structures, Estonia can be a test case. As its neighbor to the east (Russia) still maintains a sizable military presence, and minor border disputes to the east and south pose a threat to Estonian autonomy, an effective military structure is imperative.

The opening paragraph of the Estonian Constitution sets the tone of Estonian commitment to Defense

With unwavering faith and a steadfast will to strengthen and develop the state, which is established on the inextinguishable right of the people of Estonia to national self-determination and which was proclaimed on 24 February 1998, which is founded on liberty, justice and law, which shall protect internal and external peace, and is a pledge to present and future generations for their social progress and welfare<sup>63</sup>

Additionally, in Chapter X of the Estonian Constitution, the National Defense Policy is established. This chapter clearly provides for a military, national conscription and the governmental responsibilities during peacetime and times of war. Under paragraph 126 of Chapter X it is stated: "The organization of the Estonian Defense

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<sup>63</sup> Estonian Constitution 3 November 1996, Available [Online]: <webmaster@rk.ee> [23 May 1998].

Forces and National Defense organizations shall be provided by law."<sup>64</sup> This establishes several different organizations for the defense of Estonia. Currently the Estonia military structure consists of

Ground Forces (Estonian Defense Forces - EDF, Navy, Air, and Air Defense Force (not officially sanctioned), Maritime Border Guard, Volunteer Defense League (NDL), Security Forces (internal and border troops) and a Coast Guard.<sup>65</sup>

Given its current population, the available manpower within Estonia is "396,588 males ages 15-49: 311,838 males fit for military service; 11,915 males reaching military age (18) annually (1995 est.)."<sup>66</sup> Not all of these males are capable of serving in the active forces at the same time. Estonia has neither the budget nor the will to maintain a large standing army. With Estonia's security concerns, the only recourse is an effective reserve-component system able to quickly mobilize the available manpower. Estonia will not have the luxury of a large build up time for combat operations. The combat power needed to stem an aggressive act against Estonia must be quickly accessible, and capable of demonstrating Estonia's will for national survival.

Currently, the Estonian leadership is working with two reserve force concepts: 1) The NDL (Kaitseliit), which is community based within the 15 districts located in Estonia and 2) the National Reserve system, which conducted its first "muster" within the last year. The following discussion focuses on the NDL, its current status, and its level of proficiency.

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 1996-1997*, (Washington / London, Brassey's, 1996) 134.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the NDL (NDL) has reemerged within Estonia. This organization which was first established in late autumn 1918 was designed as a "National self-initiated defense organization."<sup>67</sup> Its charter was the "unitary real defense of the Independent Republic of Estonia, which organized the brave patriotically minded Estonian men to establish order in the young state of Estonia and provided for the safety for citizens."<sup>68</sup>

During its early years the NDL provided the Republic with active defense against the occupying Germans and later thwarted the Bolshevik rebellion on December 1, 1924 from becoming a threat to the Estonian nation. Just prior to World War II the NDL,

a well organized force representing the whole nation, had been formed, and was excellently trained, especially in marksmanship training. At that time together with its special organizations the Kaitseliit [NDL] had 100,000 members (one tenth of the Estonian population) and was an expressive proof of the nation's will to defend itself.<sup>69</sup>

However, before the Soviet occupation prior to World War II, the government required:

all weapons belonging to the Kaitseliit [NDL], to be turned in, effectively eliminating any potential form of resistance to the overwhelming Soviet might. Many Estonians feel that the Government in place in 1930, sold out the Estonian Republic.<sup>70</sup>

There is great controversy today over this issue, since Soviet might could have quickly crushed an active resistance, while many believe the Estonia resistance within the NDL could have been quite effective against the Soviets. The historical fact was that the

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<sup>67</sup> *Kaitseliit*, 1997, Estonian Defense League "Pamphlet". Tallinn Estonia:

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Toom, Aivar 2LT, Estonian Defense Force (General Staff). Interviewed by author, 24 May 1998, in person, Monterey California.

NDL was never allowed to take the field and prove its capabilities in the 1930s, as it had done in 1918.

During World War II, members of the organization fought on both sides of the conflict, since both sides occupied Estonia. After the end of the war, Soviet occupation prohibited the NDL from being a recognized organization, because of its nationalistic mentality.

Although the Kaitseliit [NDL] does not trace its lineage to the "Forest Brothers" (the resistance organization that lasted ten years against Soviet occupation), many members of the former Kaitseliit [NDL] actively participated in the resistance movement.<sup>71</sup>

The NDL has resurfaced after over forty years of remaining dormant. This quasi-military organization represents the first reserve military organization within the Estonian Defense structure. Since Estonian Independence, many Estonians have become actively involved with the NDL and within five short years its numbers increased to approximately "8,000 Kaitseliit [NDL] members, and together with the special organizations there are over 12,000 members (Women's home defense, Young Eagles, Home Daughters, Staff)."<sup>72</sup> This represents approximately .008 percent of the "1,436,558 (July 1997 est.)"<sup>73</sup> Estonian population.

It is evident that the NDL represents the reserve component and citizen-soldier concept within the Estonian nation. The question that remains however is whether the

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> *Kaitseliit*, 1997, Estonian Defense League "Pamphlet". Tallinn Estonia:

<sup>73</sup> *Joint Contact Team Program*. 21 April 1998. Available [Online]  
<<http://www.eucom.mil/programs/jctp/>> [22 April 1998].

NDL constitutes a professional organization. That can be assessed made by using the variables that I have outlined in earlier chapters.

## **1. Organization**

The organization of the NDL is based on its own internal structure and is not comparable to the Estonian Defense Force. Although the missions of the NDL and its geographical dispersion is somewhat different from that of the active army, the combat unit's organization should be fundamentally the same if interoperability is to be achieved. While the organization of the Estonian Defense Force units are designed for war-fighting missions, the design of the combat sub-units of the NDL do not follow the same organizational structure. It is assumed that some of these units are tailored for combat operations, but are configured differently and do not mirror their war fighting active duty counterparts.

The NDL has a clearly defined structure, which provides for a functional command trace, and a staff section. This structure is comprehensible, and easily understood in military terms as seen in Figure 5. An organization known as a Malev is set up within each of Estonia's fifteen provinces. The size of a *Malev*<sup>74</sup> is the same approximate size as an United States Army Brigade (approximately 2000 personnel) and Estonian Defense force structure indicated that there are fifteen Malevs,<sup>75</sup> that means the

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> *Kaitseliit*, 1997, Estonian Defense League "Pamphlet". Tallinn Estonia:

total manpower (including other organizations within the Malev) would be approximately 0.023 percent of the population.

The overall results of an analysis of NDL are as follows:

- The Estonian NDL does not achieve the standard of a structure that is consistent with other equivalent military organizations of that country's military force structure. The ability of like units to be deployed by senior officers and staffs, is critical, and tables of organization and equipment should match.
- The structure must be capable of accomplishing an assigned war-fighting mission. Although, there is a combat organization within the NDL its overall structure is designed as a social organization. This aspect can not be effectively evaluated without further extensive study, remaining a subject in question.
- Clearly defined organizational structure. The current structure of the Malev shows the capability of effective, well defined organization.
- The organizations must be obtainable, realistic and achievable. Units need to be structured and located in geographically supportive communities. This should be based on population and means of transportation. "The strength of
- these groups [NDL] differs from 80 men in smaller towns to 200 men in towns like Parnu."<sup>76</sup> This is demographic issue is inherent with any Reserve structured organization. The units that are located in populated areas and have

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<sup>76</sup> Stefan, Marx *Jane's Intelligence Review, EUROPE*. (Jane's February 1994) 53.



a large pool of members to draw from appear to be doing quite well. Conversely, those that are located in geographically unsupportable areas suffer from lack of an adequate recruiting pool. This means that units will have to conform to geographical population shifts. This is evident within the Parnu area where the original company has been expanded to a battalion. This provides the area with the needed force structure to allow this unit to expand.




Figure 5. Organization of Estonian National Defense League Malev

- While still in its embryonic stage of development, the NDL has shown great promise in the area of the organization of small units (squads, teams etc.). Its squads and teams have shown great capability during several competitions within the Estonian Defense force games. The NDL also hosts these games and rewards units for outstanding performance in soldier skills.

## **2. Equipping**

Currently, the NDL is armed with ex-Soviet light arms, and privately owned weapons. Soviet weapon maintenance is rudimentarily simple and the systems are quite dependable under adverse conditions. Although reliable, this mixture of private and ex-Soviet equipment will cause eventual logistical concerns in the future, because of the diverse calibers and inconsistency of integrated weapons throughout the organization. Based on my conversation with LTC Tammelia, I understand that the United States is providing Estonia with a large shipment of M-14 rifles. This weapon is an outstanding field rifle and has a proven combat record in Vietnam. This rifle will provide the needed firepower to the infantry squads. If provided to the EDF and NDL units, the only ammunition the Estonian military would have to procure would be NATO 7.62mm, which can be obtained in most regional countries. Since "Estonia's goal is to develop its own military industrial complex"<sup>77</sup> the ability to produce one standard caliber of ammunition is critical. Selection of a standard caliber could afford logistics planners the ability to simplify the focus of the military industry.

Within the limits of Estonia's tiny defense budget, the available equipment that is relevant to the organization's task. For the infantry units, small arms weapons are available however, these units are lacking when it comes to the anti-tank and indirect fire mode. Since a major threat to Estonia's security is the instability in Russia, any act of aggression will manifest itself in the use of a Motorized Rifle Regiment (or greater). Therefore a heavy emphasis on anti-tank weaponry is needed within infantry units.

Estonian leaders understand this and have been addressing this problem. Their efforts have resulted in accession of recoilless rifles and 105mm howitzers from foreign contributors. However, the need for larger amounts of anti-tank weapons integrated within the combat units is still a concern.

Maintenance time to keep the equipment operational should be kept at a minimum, to maximize valuable training time. Estonia can achieve this, since there are few, if any, high tech, maintenance intensive weapons in their inventory. The only systems that are considered high tech are found in the communications units. These are part of the active duty component, whose personnel have the time to train and maintain the equipment. Ex-Soviet equipment and weapons are designed for ease of care, and maintenance, and have been the main weapon of the NDL. With the advent of the M-14, routine maintenance will continue to be at the soldier level.

The technical qualities of the equipment should not be time intensive, thereby reducing training time. Estonia can achieve this standard, since all assigned equipment is rudimentarily simple to operate.

### **3. Training the Force**

The NDL is currently suffering from the same problems as its active duty counterpart, in that it lacks standardized training. Unit commanders do have training standards, in accordance with LTC Tammillia comments, but are also free to train in an unstructured manner on tasks to their particular liking. While many commanders have

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<sup>77</sup> Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, e-mail, Tallinn Estonia, and in person 23 Sept 1998.

Soviet military experience, within recent years many have been trained in Finland, United States, Sweden, and other countries. Consequently, fundamental battle tasks are not standardized. A squad in one Malev may not be training to the same standard (or for that matter to the same task) as a corresponding squad in another Malev. This is a problem plaguing the Active component as well, and is currently under analysis by the General Staff. Until a resolution of standardized training within all Estonian forces is implemented, training will be disorganized and unable to achieve higher collective tasks above company (150 - man organization) level, and organized tactical maneuvers will be difficult. Although the Kaitseliit [NDL] has a long heritage of marksmanship training,<sup>78</sup> and has achieved high results, the maneuvering of forces above squad level will require identified tasks. Until Estonians establish a universal training standard for maneuver tasks, this type of training is unachievable.

The overall results of Estonian Training levels are as follows:

- Standardized training that is universally used within the nation's defense structure needs to be finalized and instituted in all units.
- Available training time needs to be maximized to accomplish war-fighting tasks.

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

- The war-fighting tasks need to be identified and placed into two categories:
  - Sustainment: These tasks to be accomplished during peacetime
  - Mobilization: Tasks that are not trained on during peace time, but must be achieved prior to deployment into combat operations

This two-tiered level of training cannot be achieved until training standards have been identified and separated as indicated above. Since Estonia would require rapid mobilization (short in duration) sustainment training would have to address most of the tasks needed for combat operations. This would therefore set the standard for the amount of training time needed by Estonian reserve forces to maintain high levels of readiness.

#### **4. Leadership Dimension**

Leadership, in the minds of most military experts is the most critical dynamic of any military organization. Leadership is the basis on which all other fundamentals are built. Without a command structure, which provides the direction and goals of an organization, anarchy prevails. In Estonia's case, this area is in transition, as would be expected. The current "higher military officers are Estonian loyal, Soviet trained officers"<sup>79</sup>. The current tone of leadership is Soviet style, but with an open mind to the future. Aspects of Western leadership principles are under consideration for adaptation to the Estonian leadership-training model. The current focus of attention, at the General Staff and Ministry of Defense levels, is the establishment of a standardized officer qualification system. Factions within the military infrastructure want an academic

military academy, which provides the officer candidates with civilian education, and military technical skills. Others want a grass roots officer's training course (similar to an American Officer Candidate School program) that just teaches leadership and military techniques for qualification of junior officers. Agreement has been realized on having a professional officer-training course focused heavily on the professional and tactical aspects of leaders. The senior leadership is "primarily focused on training future leaders to met the challenges of national Estonian defense security"<sup>80</sup> in the coming years. By focusing on officer training, other fundamental concerns within the Estonian military community can be resolved in time. Currently, Estonian senior level military leadership has expertise in Soviet training and several officers have experience in Afghanistan. This knowledge and experience will be directed towards a more Western style principle of leadership as the responsibility of officership is currently under revision. The senior leadership has been rocked by several scandals including as an illegal weapons exchange with shades of black-market deals. This has caused the resignation of key figures including the Defense Force Commander Einseln (a former United States Army Colonel) who is currently facing charges of "harming the states' interests for having granted the permission for the import of guns."<sup>81</sup> Therefore, the responsibility of the Estonian leadership has been under scrutiny and the current commander (General Johannes Kert) is

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<sup>79</sup> Toom, Aivar 2LT, Estonian Defense Force (General Staff). Interviewed by author, 24 May 1998, in person, Monterey, California.

<sup>80</sup> Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, e-mail, Tallinn Estonia.

<sup>81</sup> *Defense Review*. Unknown Copyright. [22 April 1998]. No. 16-98.

pressing for reforms. The corporate aspects of the organization would be impacted by the type of leadership training and living conditions that will be developed in the coming years. The characteristic of military leadership in Estonia can be assessed as follows:

- The expertise of officership within Estonia can only be considered under transition at this time. The on Western style leadership will result in initial changes at the middle management level.
- The responsibility of officership within the Estonian military is in crisis, since leadership is the target of several scandals. The focus on Western style leadership may also prevent further problems. This can also be considered a societal norm which through effective leadership training and the proper focus, can be directed in the way the Estonian senior leadership desires.
- The corporate character of officers within the Estonian military is evolving. As the older Soviet style "combat commanders" move out of the system and are replaced with progressive, western style leaders, comradeship and national focus will prevail.

Estonian reserve forces show signs of, and great potential for, professionalism.

Their nationalistic spirit and determination provide the base for a reserve structure that can be professional, competent, and a combat force to contend with. However the identified deficiencies could deter the Estonian NDL from effectively achieving its desire to become a professional reserve component.

## **IV. CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. ESTONIA'S FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS**

As indicated in this research, it is apparent that Estonia is making great strides towards becoming a consolidated democratic nation. As Estonia moves forward, its sovereignty will be in question if it can not sustain its national security. It is clear from history and current world events that Russia is ultimately the largest threat to Estonian sovereignty. Although the Estonian active duty forces would put up a valiant effort, its numbers, equipment, and various levels of training would be no match against Russian might. There is no doubt that a divisional size organization, in conjunction with airborne, and airmobile forces could effectively occupy Estonia within a few days. However, the true fight will be the Estonian people because of their nationalism and commitment to the Estonian state. Its committed population would continue to provide resistance while political efforts would spearhead international support within the world community to reestablish Estonia as an independent state.

Therefore, I believe that Estonia should look very hard at how it can quickly and effectively mobilize the population to counter a threat to national security. Estonian's military, political, and cultural might lays firmly with the population. By capitalizing on the strengths (as well as the weakness) of a reserve component structure, Estonia can achieve several benefits to social capital and as well as a major asset to the national defense posture.

The first of such issues is basing the national defense organization on the grass roots of society. The Estonian community can readily identify with such an organization,



since families and other people join up. This approach has a tendency of producing community involvement, and social capital. When identity is established with the Estonian military, public support and commitment will become second nature. Currently most Estonians understand the need for a military, but their understanding is based on the former Soviet Red Army as the strong arm of an oppressive regime. Placing the bulk of the Estonian military defense at the grass roots level will result in identification with the Estonian society, thereby improving the civil military relationships with the community.

A reserve component or citizen-soldier concept is non-threatening on the international level, since by its nature the citizen occupies his/her profession during the day, and dons the uniform for the defense of the nation in times of need. This inherent aspect of the citizen-soldier concept provides a clear signal to international actors. Estonia is committed to the survival of its sovereignty, and it is not interested in expansion or is a threat to the sovereignty of other regional nations.

A reserve structure by its nature is cost effective. It costs less to sustain a reservist as compared to an active duty soldier, since there is no need to house the soldier and provide for other soldier welfare requirements. Even when a reservist is paid, there are more cost savings as compared to his active duty counterpart. By carefully determining the number of days of training needed to maintain a desired level of proficiency, the total amount of man dollars (kroons) expended would be considerably less than the amount required to pay for a active duty soldier. Along with reduced costs there are residual benefits. Government money would be placed directly into the community in a way that is proportional to the demographics of the reserve units. The

incentive to serve and be paid will cause for an increase in numbers, and may be considered a reward for service to the Estonian State.

Additionally reduced costs can be realized in the sustainment of equipment, and materials. Since a reserve component does not utilize its equipment and materials on a daily basis, the equipment will not sustain large amounts of fair wear and tear, and will therefore maintain a longer service life. Substantial cost savings can be realized in the reduced amount of usage. All in all, when constructed in an efficient manner, a reserve component can provide a military force that is cost effective. This is desirable for any small defense budget.

Estonia is currently maintaining its active forces through a one-year conscription program. This system can be modified to provide manpower sources for a reserve component. A conscript who has completed his one-year commitment is a trained asset that is lost to the Estonian military infrastructure. Therefore, a policy of "pay to stay" should be considered. This, along with training soldiers for civilian endeavors could produce extended value to trained soldiers. Through the creation of laws, a conscript can extend his service for a number of years in the reserve forces. This allows for the money used to train the conscript to be extended longer, therefore creating a for cost effective means of maintaining an efficient national defense posture.

The large number of Russian ethnic people in Estonia may constitute a potential threat to Estonian national security through the formation of a "fifth column" movement. The Estonian Defense establishment can ill afford to ignore this potential threat. . The best way to identify a potential "fifth column" operation is at the grass roots level.

A practical aspect of a reserve organization is that it can actively defend the nation at its lowest level. Through community involvement, people see the development and can convey this information to the appropriate authorities, which in this case could be the NDL. What better way to identify and counteract a grass roots fifth column effort, than by the establishment and maintenance of a reserve component organization closely tied to the community? Therefore, the need to identify any fifth column organization is something that needs to be considered, and can best be done by a decentralized NDL.

Reserve organizations by their nature and demographics, are decentralized organizations. A reserve organization is capable of going "underground" and operating autonomously. Thus a decentralized reserve would provide Estonia with an organization that is capable of operating directly with a command structure, but can still be proficient when the command relationship is severed. This duality would pose an interesting threat to an external aggressor.

A reserve force is uniquely qualified to provide support to the civil authority at the grass roots level. This is usually evident in the United States through support to state and local agencies during natural disaster, or civil disobedience. Reserve forces can be put into service to support the civil authority with equipment and manpower. This additional asset to the civilian authority is yet another benefit to a reserve component.

With Estonia located on the Baltic the weather conditions are very cold and snowy. In extreme conditions, reserve units can be called upon to assist with natural disasters much like the American National Guard. This ability to depend on a community based force during times of emergency and civil disobedience allows the local government more assets and resources to solve problems at the lowest level. "This availability has already been demonstrated within the NDL during rescue operations involving a school bus accident outside of Tartu. NDL units provided the needed manpower to assist local agencies to gather up children injured in a school bus accident."<sup>82</sup>

With these social conditions in their various stages of development, it is safe to say that the conditions are ripe for Estonia to embrace the citizen-soldier concept. However, there are critical decisions that have to be made to capitalize on the benefits of the reserve organization indicated. The first consideration is to determine the type of reserve component organization desired, since there are several courses of actions available to the Estonian Defense establishment. There are many Western models evaluate and to emulate. Regardless of the system the Estonians select, it has to be adapted to the Estonian condition. As revealed in this research, Estonia currently has two reserve component structures, the NDL and a centralized reserve formation. The reserve system has seen its first test at mobilization within the last six months, and shows promise. The NDL has made great strides but lacks the resources and standardization required to fight above the company level. I would contend that Estonia, needs to adopt

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<sup>82</sup> Guderjohn, Larry W. COL, MLT Estonia Team Chief (EUCOM). Interviewed by author, 20 April 1998, e-mail, Tallinn Estonia, and in person 23 Sept 1998.

one reserve system and begin to funnel resources in that direction. With Estonia's current inadequate defense budget, it is imperative that critical assets are not wasted on two different reserve components. Therefore, I believe that Estonia should look very hard at how it can quickly and effectively mobilize the population to counter a threat to national security.

#### **B. PROFESSIONALIZING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE LEAGUE (KAITSELIIT)**

The NDL is my personal choice for a reserve force based on several empirical factors. First, it can easily be decentralized. This will improve its survivability during a major military invasion. The NDL can easily be capitalized upon, being already established and rooted in the local community. Additionally, the NDL contains within its organization other groups that can provide social capital. This is exactly the type of benefit that a young energetic democracy needs. Finally the NDL has a tradition of service to the Estonian State, and promotes the patriotic spirit that has been damaged during the occupation.

The following areas should be considered to improve the NDL, and make it more professional:

- There are many existing reserve component models (e.g. Switzerland, United States, England, Sweden, Finland) to evaluate for the purposes of their adaptability to the Estonian culture. No one model should be copied entirely, but an evaluation of those systems that are successful should be done. A unique Estonian reserve component model can be developed for the NDL. The Swiss model has a uniquely European quality, while the United States

National Guard model shows the ability to decentralize. Comparing and contrasting other reserve systems can isolate the positive aspects of each which can be applied to the NDL.

- No matter what system is selected, there will be the need to support it. If little or no resources are placed into a reserve, it will fail during time of need. The monetary savings of a reserve are self evident: pay is based on time served (which is less than the active soldier), there is no need to billet troops since they reside at home, and equipment maintains a long service life because it is not used and abused. The cost involved must be realized and built into the defense budget for Estonia to utilize effectively any reserve system. By focusing on the NDL there a residual benefit is obtained. The money placed in this organization will also find its way into the communities and will also help stimulate the social capital provided by this organization provides.
- Integration with Active Forces. During the course of this research I discovered that the Active duty units are spending time with their respective local NDL units. Training is being conducted, and relationships are being established. This integration needs to be expanded to the point where the active forces and NDL conduct training operations together, and become more effectively integrated. The early stages of this process have begun, and it is critical that the process be allowed to continue and expand. I would recommend that the NDL combat organizations not exceed one battalion size organization within each Malev. This will allow interaction with active forces

at a lower level. By starting at the individual level and progressively moving up to conducting unit and staff operations, this integration can be achieved. NDL squads should work closely with their active duty contemporaries for a period of about two years. Once this has been accomplished the next step would be to do the same at the platoon level. By conducting operations with the active component the NDL will gain confidence, create a harmonious working relationship, lower the active / reserve barrier, keep up on contemporary changes in doctrine and increase its level of readiness. This interrelationship will provide the start point of a total force concept and create a more harmonious atmosphere between the active component and the NDL.

- Organization: War fighters are not social groups. There needs to be a separation of the war fighting units and the social groups in the NDL. This will insure that during operations there is no confusion as to the duties and responsibilities, so that the organization is able to function efficiently. This will take away the vale of the "Good Old Boy" club, and allow it to function as a combat unit. It is critical to have such a interrelationship with the social organizations, as long as it does not interfere with readiness, or combat operations. The unit should be easily accessible, capable of divorcing itself from social responsibilities, and maintaining combat standards. In order to reduce this issue it is necessary to establish and enforce individual readiness standards. As these individual standards are applied, two things will occur: 1) all soldiers will understand their necessity, since the standards should be based

on combat survivability (tasks like shooting, physical fitness, education, etc.) and 2) those who do not meet the standards will either rise to the standards or move on. In the example of the NDL they can continue their service within the social organization, thereby providing support to the war-fighters. Estonia's unique example can provide a win-win situation for anyone wishing to provide service to the nation.

- Combat unit sizes and force structure: Estonian demographics will dictate the size and structure of units. These units need to contain the same elements as their respective active duty counterparts. In this way command elements will know how to deploy these units in times of conflict. It is also important to consider the demographic factor, and not follow the mistake of the United States National Guard which placed units where the population density is not conducive to support large units.
- Leadership training: Although very difficult for the EDL, the officer training should be the same as the active duty officer. There may be some modification due to training time, but the standards should be exactly the same. This will be a difficult venture, since training time will be at a premium. However, the end result will be a homogenized leadership corps that has shared experiences and understanding. This will produce mutual respect between the active serve and the NDL, and therefore lower the degree of separation between the two components. A residual effect will be that leadership skills and principles provided to the members of the NDL will



uniquely find their way into the Estonian private sector. These leadership principles are universal and can be used in business and other social undertakings. The question remains whether the leadership training should be built from the bottom-up or top-down. At this time I feel that Soviet leadership still heavily influences the leadership and training styles, so I would recommend a bottom-up approach. This will allow the steady, yet consistent change of leadership philosophy to migrate within the leadership corps. There may also be a concerted effort on the senior leadership to look at foreign examples to insure that the direction is in accordance with Estonian wishes. This will allow Estonia to mirror leadership training to fit their particular need, which is decentralized leadership with a focus on individual and leader initiative. Therefore I would recommend that the Estonians adopt the fundamentals of American Military Leadership principles contained within FM 22-100 (Leadership).

- Equipment: This will be extremely difficult for the defense establishment to achieve due to their limited budget. The only effective recourse is a long-range strategy of procurement, which will provide for standardized equipment and ordinance for the active serve and the NDL. Ammunition and weapon systems can be standardized between the two components for the purpose of interoperability.
- Standardized training: Once a set of training requirements and standards is established by the Estonian defense authorities for individual and collective

tasks, the units can be trained to a desired readiness level. These standards should be universal within the Estonian military for both the active and reserve components. For the reserve component these standards would be broken down between sustainment and mobilization training tasks. The reserve component should focus primarily on individual tasks and those collective tasks that would be needed to mobilize quickly. This is based on the threat level Estonia should anticipate within its strategic planning process. The threat level will also provide for the ability to utilize the NDL for other than military operations. The NDL can be mobilized to provide needed manpower for natural disasters and civil disturbances. Therefore at any given time, the NDL can be mobilized and the training tailored to the purpose of the mobilization. Although trained for combat operations, when mobilized, the NDL can use the mobilization training time to prepare for emergency response and not just for combat operations.

- Pay and allowances: Estonian reserve soldiers should be paid. There are currently great morale problems in this area and they should be addressed within the Estonian defense establishment. Some type of pay should be considered for the reserve component. This would provide an extra incentive for soldiers to be available for training. The Estonian defense establishment should also consider other types of incentives to include limited medical benefits, insurance, and possibility of college credits for equivalent military training. This provides incentives to the community to become involved with

military service and the additional education will create more highly educated community.

- Legislative support: Soldier and employers rights should be legislated to protect both the citizen-soldiers and their respective employers. Since military training could interfere with a soldier's civilian profession, legal statutes should establish rights for both the soldier and the employer. The law needs protect the community, the private sector and the individual.

By focusing on the areas that I have indicated, I feel the Estonian Defense establishment can achieve a viable reserve establishment within the NDL that is cost effective and can provide for the defense of Estonia. Given Estonia's current situation and limitations this option appears to be the only one that makes sense and provides residual social benefits that can enhance Estonian society. This win-win situation can enable Estonia to create a strong defense, which will deter any external threat and provide a rallying point for the Estonian society in furthering their patriotic values.

When looking at the two existing organizations, the reserve system appears to be centralized, while the NDL, which is located in the fifteen districts, is decentralized. The Estonian defense establishment needs to identify the type of organization it wants. As indicated, the budget can ill afford the active component much less the addition of structures for a centralized reserve. By improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the NDL the Estonian Defense establishment can build upon an existing reserve system and gain residual benefit from the social capital developed in the NDL. Therefore, I would

conclude that there is a lot of benefit in professionalizing the NDL, and that Estonia should decide against a centralized reserve system.

### C. CONCLUSION

Estonia has shown great promise as a nation state. By moving quickly to consolidate democracy, Estonia has shown its potential to become a progressive and democratic society. These principles can only thrive if Estonia has the military forces necessary to maintain its sovereignty as a nation state.

Military force structure decisions must reflect the nature of the external threat to a country's sovereignty. When the threat levels are high standing armies are necessary. For instance, the volatile security in the Balkan region forces even an economically deprived nation like Croatia to devote large amounts of their budget to sustain a standing army. The corollary is that when threat levels are low, standing armies are less necessary, and can pose a threat to domestic stability. In the case of Estonia, where the threat level is low, a standing army is less appropriate to rely on than reserve forces.

Estonia also requires a system of defense that emulates the principles of its democratic society. The best way to provide a progressive civilian-military relationship within the democratic environment is to link the army with the people. The way to maintain a military structure, without posing a threat to the established democratic government, is to have a military formed by the people, who themselves are the government.

By developing a framework to assess a professional reserve component, and by using it to evaluate the Estonian NDL, I have shown that the Estonian Defense

establishment needs to make some long term organizational decisions regarding the citizen-soldier concept. First, Estonia should focus its attention on only one reserve component organization, either a centralized reserve system or the NDL. Second, I would contend that Estonia should build on the existing structure of the NDL, which provides more benefits than the man-power pool of a centralized reserve. Third, the Estonian Defense establishment should consider professionalizing the NDL utilizing most if not all of the variables that I have provided in this thesis. The desired consequence of that decision would be a NDL that will provide the Estonian Defense establishment with a reserve force capable of being professional and contributing to the national defense.

This progressive and innovative idea of the citizen-soldier is hardly new, and we have seen many examples around the world that prove it can work. Its ability to work will depend on the Estonian people. The recommendations that I have presented reflect an outsider's understanding of the social conditions, and military professionalism in Estonia. Ultimately, however it will be the Estonian application that makes the citizen-soldier concept a reality for Estonia. I have determined, through this analysis, that the component parts exist, and they need to be nurtured over time to achieve the desired end state of a democratic nation supported by a civilian based military, capable of making an external aggressor think twice before initiating military action. This is the desired purposed behind the building of any defensive military force, and is clearly applicable to Estonia's case.

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